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'When you go into a hospital, you should be safer than when 
you step onto an airplane. "1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
David Lawrence is not the first member of the medical 
establishment to compare the risks of being a patient in a 
hospital to the risks of being a passenger on an airplane flight. 2 
The chief operating officer of the Veterans Administration's vast 
health care system recently made similar public statements.3 In 
1. Tom Abate, Kaiser CEO Warns About Drug Errors, S.F. CHRON., June 30, 
1999, at B1 (quoting David Lawrence, CEO, Kaiser Permanente). David Lawrence's 
comments in his speech to biotechnology industry executives were repeated the next 
month at a National Press Club Newsmaker Luncheon, where he was quoted as 
saying, "[O]ne can conclude that the third-leading cause of death in the United 
States are [sic] fatal accidents that result from [medical errors]. These accidents are 
responsible for over 400,000 deaths each year, more than tobacco, stroke, diet, 
alcohol, drugs, firearms or automobile accidents .... " National Press Club 
Newsmaker Luncheon with Dr. David Lawrence, CEO, Kaiser Permanente, FED. 
NEWS SERVICE, July 14, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library, Transcripts File. 
2. At a hearing addressing Veterans Administration medical care, Lucian 
Leape of the Harvard School of Public Health asked, "Why is it that when you enter 
a hospital, your chances of dying from an accident are 1 in 200, but when you climb 
on an airplane, your chances of dying in an accident are 1 in two million[?]" VA 
Medical Care: Hearing of the Health Subcomm. of the House Veterans' Affairs 
Comm., 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Lucian Leape, Harvard School of Public 
Health) [hereinafter Hearing, statement of Lucian Leape], available in LEXIS, News 
Library, Transcripts File (discussing the VA:s efforts to prevent patient injury). 
3. In 1997, Kenneth W. Kizer, then Under Secretary for Health, Department 
of Veterans' Affairs, in testimony before Congress spoke of systems redesign as a 
means of increasing patient safety. See Prepared Statement of Kenneth W. Kizer, 
M.D., M.P.H., Under Secretary for Health, Dep't of Veterans' Affairs Before the House 
Veterans' Affairs Comm. Health Subcomm. on VA's Risk Management Policies, FED. 
NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 8, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Transcripts File 
(describing the VA:s new error prevention systems, including the creation of a Risk 
Management Oversight Committee and increased evaluative functions of tho 
existing Office of the Medical Inspector). On May 14, 1999, Leape; Kizer; Robert 
Simon, Ed.D., C.P.E., Chief Scientist, Crew Performance Group, Dynamics Research 
Corporation; and Senator Bill Frist (R-Tenn.) participated in a discussion of the 
National Health Policy Forum, which addressed opportunities for a systems-based 
approach to error reduction and considered how the aviation approach of 
"restructuring the delivery environment and retraining" might be applied to improve 
patient safety. See Reducing Medical Error: Can You Be as Safe in a Hospital as You 
Are in a Jet?, NAT'LHEALTHPOL'¥F., May 14, 1999, at 2. 
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1998, a Presidential Commission suggested that the Federal 
Aviation Safety Reporting System4 was a possible model for 
developing a "blame-free system of error reporting., that would 
identify and help prevent the reoccurrence of errors in the health 
care system.5 With this new emphasis on preventing patient 
injury and the metaphor of "safe" airline travel has come a new 
way of conceptualizing the causes of patient injury: "systems 
errors" and "systems thinking." 
The "systems" approach to patient injury grew out of a 
seminal multidisciplinary study of malpractice in New York 
State in the 1980s, 6 when "no fault" was thought to be one 
possible solution to the "malpractice crisis."7 The most significant 
4. The Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) is an "incident reporting 
program designed to identify issues and hazards existing or emerging in the national 
aviation system ... [and] is administered by the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) under a 
management and funding agreement initiated in 1975." FAA Wake Vortex 
Regulations: Hearings Before Subcomm. on Technology, Environment and Aviation 
of the House Comm. on Science, Technology and Space, 103d Cong. (1994) (statement 
of William Reynard, Director, Aviation Safety Reporting System), auailable in 1994 
WL 14190976. The reports are analyzed by a contractor, Battelle Memorial 
Institute, which is a research institution that employs retired aviation professionals. 
See id. 
5. See THE PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COMM'N ON CONSUMER PROTECTION AND 
QUALITY IN THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY, QUALITY FIRST: BETTER HEALTH CARE 
FOR ALL AMERICANS, FINAL REP. TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 155 
(1998) [hereinafter PREsiDENT'S COMM'N REP.] (calling for a national effort by 
federal, state, and local governments, health care professionals and workers, 
employers, health plans, consumers, unions, and others to improve and sustain the 
quality of health care in the United States). 
6. See HARVARD MED. PRAC. STUDY, PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND LAWYERS: 
MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIG. AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK 
(1990) (providing empirical data under contract for the State of New York in order to 
inform the debate surrounding the malpractice liability system). The study had four 
main components: a measure of the incidence of injuries resulting from medical 
intervention, an estimate of the number of claims borne of such injury, a calculation 
of the costs suffered by injured victims, and an estimate of the CA1:ent to which a 
threat of litigation affected patient injury. See id. at 1-2; see also Troyen A. Brennan 
et al., Incidence of Adverse Events and Negligence in Hospitalized Patients: Results of 
the Harvard Medical Practice Study I, 324 NEW ENG. J. I\IED. 370, 383 (1991); 
Lucian L. Leape et al., The Nature of Adverse Events in Hospitalized Patients: 
Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study II, 324 NEW ENG. J. I\IED. 377, 377, 
383 (1991) [hereinafter Leape et al., The Nature of Adverse Events]. 
7. See, e.g., Larry M. Pollack, Medical Maloccurrence Insurance fMMIJ: A 
First-Party, No-Fault Insurance Proposal for Resolving the Medical Malpractice 
Controversy, 23 TORTS & INS. L.J. 552, 552-53 (1988) (proposing a "patient-derived 
(first-party) 'no-fault' insurance system to compensate victims of iatrogenic 
maloccurrence, regardless of negligence," that would require patients to buy an 
insurance policy for a particular course of treatment or operation and under which 
the patient would be covered for any treatment-related adverse medical outcome 
regardless of negligence or fault on the part of the health care providers); see also, 
e.g., Randall R. Bovbjerg & Frank A. Sloan, No-Fault for Medical Injury: Theory and 
Evidence, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 53, 56, 82-113 (1998) (repor~g on "no fault" as "a 
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finding of that study was that patient injuries deemed by health 
care professionals to be caused by substandard care resulted in 
almost no malpractice litigation.8 With special legislation 
authorizing the study,9 the researchers were able to examine the 
records of patients in nonpsychiatric hospitals in the entire state 
of New York.10 Based upon "chart reviews" performed by nurses, 
medical-records analysts, and physicians, the researchers were 
able to estimate the medical error rate among hospitalized 
patients.11 The principal investigator of the study, Lucian Leape 
of the Harvard Public Health School, has become the leading 
spokesman for the patient safety movement in the media, 12 
professional journals, 13 and other public forums.14 Leape testified 
leading alternative to today's liability systems for resolving medically caused 
injuries" and discussing the Virginia and Florida no-fault legislation enacted in the 
late 1980s for medical injuries). 
8. See A Russell Localio et al., Relation Between Malpractice Claims and 
Adverse Events Due to Negligence: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study III, 
325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 245, 247 (1991) (reporting that the probability that injuries 
caused by medical negligence would lead to litigation was only 1.53%). 
9. See Act of July 8, 1986, ch. 266, 1986 N.Y. Laws 2021, 2046. 
10. See Brennan et al., supra note 6, at 370. 
1L See id. at 370, 372. 
12. See, e.g., Sandra G. Boodman, Diagnosing Medical Errors, WASH. POST., 
Nov. 19, 1996 (Health Magazine), at 12 (quoting Leape and referring to him as a 
"nationally respected expert on the problems of medical errors"); Richard A Knox, 
'Collegial' Monitoring of Hospitals Hit, BOSTON GLOBE, July 21, 1999, at A1, 
available in LEXIS, News Library, Bglobe File (quoting Leape and referring to him 
as "perhaps the most prominent advocate nationally of a non-punitive approach to 
quality improvement"); Patricia Neighmond, Sounds Like Science: Study Shows 
Drug Errors in Hospitals Could Be Drastically Reduced If Pharmacists Were Made 
Part of Medical Teams (National Public Radio broadcast, July 24, 1999), available in 
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Newsgroup File (discussing a study conducted by Leape, "a 
longtime analyst of medical mistakes," in which he concluded that adding a 
pharmacist to a hospital medical team resulted in a two-thirds drop in prescription 
error). 
13. See, e.g., Lucian L. Leape, Error in Medicine, 272 JAMA 1851, 1852 (1994) 
[hereinafter Leape, Error in Medicine] (stating that "if physicians, nurses, 
pharmacists, and administrators are to succeed in reducing errors in hospital care, 
they will need to fundamentally change the way they think about errors and why 
they occur"); Lucian L. Leape et al., Promoting Patient Safety by Preventing Medical 
Error, 280 JAMA 1444, 1445, 1447 (1998) (critiquing error analysis, presenting four 
examples of current efforts to promote patient safety, and calling for the conversion 
of a "culture of blame that hides information about risk and error into a culture of 
safety that flushes information out and enables us to prevent or quickly recover from 
mistakes before they become patient injury"). 
14. See, e.g., Hearing, statement of Lucian Leape, supra note 2 (presenting 
his error-reduction methodology and evaluating the VA's new risk management 
policy); see also Peter Mayberry, Medication Errors: Is Unit-Dose Packaging the 
Solution?, PHARMACEUTICAL & MED. PACKAGING NEWS MAG. (Feb. 1998) 
<http://www.devicelink.com/pmpn/archive/98/021003.html> (reporting that Leape 
testified at a public hearing of the Federal Drug Administration on the issue of 
medication error and the roles of government and industry in solving the problem). 
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before the recent President's Commission on Consumer Quality, 
and the Commission's Final Report cited his work as evidence of 
"unacceptably high error rates" in health care.16 Within the last 
decade, "patient safety" has truly come of age.16 
This Article does not propose to argue that the medical 
liability system, criminal prosecution of health care 
professionals, or even disciplinary actions against professionals 
will in fact make health care safer. This Article suggests that 
there is no evidence to prove that the mere threat of civil or 
criminal liability or disciplinary action is the key vector 
inhibiting new approaches to injury prevention under the rubric 
of "systems thinking." There is in fact a disconnect between the 
new rhetoric of systems thinking about medical error and legal 
scholarship on the health care system that remains preoccupied 
with the issue ofmedicalliability. 
To develop a new framework for the role of law in enhancing 
patient safety, this Article proposes a different paradigm than 
the liability model. An examination of how law interacts with 
public health should be the starting point for framing the legal 
analysis of patient safety.17 This framing of the issues 
15. See PREsiDENT'S COMM'N REP., supra note 5, at 23. 
16. In late November 1999, the Institute of Medicine issued its report on 
medical error. See COMMITTEE ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA, INSTITUTE 
OF MEDICINE, To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System {Linda Kohn et al. 
eds., National Academy Press, Advance Copy, Nov. 1999) [hereinafter To Err Is 
Human]. Lucian Leape and David Lawrence were both members of the committee 
issuing the report. See id. at iii. Not surprisingly, aviation safety was viewed as the 
standard. See id. at 4. On December 7, 1999, President Clinton asked the Quality 
Interagency Coordination Task Force to develop recommendations regarding patient 
safety within sixty days. See Memorandum on Improving Health Care Quality and 
Ensuring Patient Safety, 35 WEEKLY CO!IIl'. PRES. Doc. 2530-31 (Dec. 7, 1999), 
available at <http://frwebgate5.access.gpo.goV>. Several members of ~ngress have 
already introduced bills to promote patient safety. See Marilyn Webber Serafini, To 
Err Is . . . Reason for a New Law, 32 NA'l"L J. 45 (Jan. 1, 2000), available at 
<http://web.lexis-nexis.com/congcomp>. 
17. Donald A Schon has written extensively about the general problem of bow 
professionals and policy makers frame issues. See generally DONALD A SCHON, THE 
REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: HOW PROFESSIONALS THINK IN ACTION (1983) 
[hereinafter SCHON, REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER] (suggesting that professionals 
know more about their practice than they are at times able to articulate and 
analyzing and systematizing these intuitive acts with the goal of promoting a 
"reflective practice"); DONALD A. SCHON & MARTIN REIN, FRAME REFLECTION: 
TOWARD THE RESOLUTION OF INTRACTABLE POLICY CONTROVERSIES (1994) 
(challenging the prevailing notion that contemplative, reflective thinking is out of 
place in the "common sense" arena of policy making and advocating "design 
rationality," a rational approach to concrete problems that includes "higher-level" 
reflection). For an application of a Schon-like analysis to a problem of law and 
medicine, see Joseph J. Fins & :Matthew D. Bacchetta, Framing the Physician· 
Assisted Suicide and Voluntary Active Euthanasia Debate: The Role of Deontology, 
Consequentialism, and Clinical Pragmatism, 43 J. AM. GERIATRIC SOCY 563, 563 
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acknowledges that the liability model may have a role to play in 
error reduction, but that this role should be determined by more 
empirical study of the law and legal institutions as part of the 
overall emerging system of patient safety. 
In proposing a new framework for the legal debate of patient 
safety, this Article does not offer a single solution to the patient 
safety problem. Hidden behind any proposed solution is a host of 
questions that have not yet been answered: What is "patient 
safety"? What is "systems thinking" about patient injury? And 
most important, what role, if any, do legal institutions need to 
play in promoting systemic approaches to injury prevention 
within health care organizations? 
Part II of this Article defines the concepts or constructs that 
frame the debate: patient safety, systems thinking, medical 
liability, and public health law. Part III explores "comparative 
institutional analysis"18 and proposes that systems thinking 
about injury prevention creates new kinds of professional 
knowledge. Surprisingly, this type of knowledge is embedded in 
organizations, not individuals, as assumed by the model of 
professional liability for patient injury.19 Part IV uses the dual 
lens of public health law and comparative institutional analysis 
to resolve problems in regulation, disciplinary procedures, 
criminal prosecution, and conducting research on patient safety 
under existing legal structures. Until systems thinking about 
preventing patient injury is widespread throughout both the 
legal and health care systems, it will be important to think of 
(1995). 
18. See NEIL K KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING 
INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PuBLIC POLICY 3 (1994) (elucidating tho 
concept of"comparative institutional analysis," which refers to the way that decision 
making authority is allocated to and among complex institutional processes, such as 
the political process, the market process, and the adjudicative process, and 
analyzing the choice among these alternatives). For examples of applications of 
comparative institutional analysis to problems in law and medicine, see Larry I. 
Palmer, Institutional Analysis and Physicians' Rights After Vacco v. Quill, 7 
CORNELL J.L. & PuB. POL 'y 415, 415, 418 (1998) (proposing that the arguments in 
Vacco v. Quill, in which the Court allowed the criminal prosecution of physicians for 
assisting patient suicides, can be read through the lens of comparative institutional 
analysis and, specifically, "an analysis of two basic social institutions: law and 
medicine"). For a more explicit positivist approach to institutional analysis in law, 
see Neil MacCormick, Institutions and Laws Again, 77 TEx. L. REV. 1429, 1429 
(1999). 
19. See, e.g., Bryan A. Liang, Patient Injury Incentives in Law, 17 YALE L. & 
POL 'y REV. 1, 5 (1998) (providing an "overview of the common law of tort and 
contract and the statutory regime that have together created incentives for MCOs 
[managed care organizations] to minimize care while exposing physicians to, on tho 
one hand, patient injury liability and, on the other, unfettered termination power in 
the hands of the MCO"); E. Haavi Morreim, Playing Doctor: Corporate Medical 
Practice and Medical Malpractice, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM (forthcoming 2000). 
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ways of reducing the legal risks to nurses and other health care 
professionals who are still "blamed" by legal actors for what 
scholars label "systems errors." 
To discover the appropriate role of law in the prevention of 
medical errors, this Article concludes that legal scholars must 
learn to pose empirical questions about how various institutions 
interact with the health care system. Some of these questions 
will involve issues related to the medical liability system, but the 
proposed interdisciplinary research will be informed by a public 
health law perspective and will necessitate new methodologies. 
II. PATIENT SAFETY AND SYSTEMS TIDNKING 
"Patient safety" and "systems thinking" are terms used by 
reformers to change health care delivery and the legal and 
regulatory structure surrounding health care. Reformers are 
motivated by visions that are often embedded in stories, rather 
than by the crisp categorical definitions of relatively stable legal 
or scientific constructs.20 The following Martin Memorial Hospital 
case21 serves as a glimpse of such visions. 
In December 1995, Ben Kolb's parents took him to Martin 
Memorial Hospital for a routine surgical procedure.22 His heart 
stopped during the procedure, and he died twenty-four hours 
later.23 Less than one month after his death, Ben's family reached 
a monetary settlement with the hospital and its insurance 
20. See, e.g., Lawrence M. O'Rourke & Tom Hamburger, "Got·ernment by 
Anecdote": In Managed-Care Debate, 1\fiNN. STAR TRIB., July 2, 1999, at A12 
(reporting that to push through their managed health care legislation in Congress, 
Democrats are "telling horror stories about ordinary people hurt by the decisions of 
their health insurance plans," including a story about a woman who fell off a cliff, 
was knocked unconscious, and was taken by helicopter to a hospital emergency room 
where she was turned away because she had not called in advance to ensure that 
her HMO would pay the bill). 
21. This story was widely reported in the media at the time. See, e.g., Lisa 
Belkin, How Can We Saue the Next Vzctim?, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1997, § 6 
(Magazine), at 28; Boodman, supra note 12, at 12. This story was also told by the 
hospital through its Director of Corporate Risk Management. See Doni Haas, In 
Memory of Ben, RISK MGMT. REP., Dec. 1998, at 1, 1. 
22. See Haas, supra note 21, at 1 (noting that Ben needed some scar tissue 
removed from his ear); see also Belkin, supra note 21, at 28 (relating that this was 
Ben's third surgery on his ear). 
23. Moments after what was thought to be a local anesthetic had been injected 
inside and behind Ben's ear, his heart rate and blood pressure increased alarmingly. 
See Belkin, supra note 21, at 28. He was stabilized, but shortly thereafter his heart 
rate and blood pressure dropped abruptly. See id. Doctors performed CPR on him for 
an hour and forty minutes. See id. Subsequently his heart began to beat again with 
the aid of a pacemaker. See Haas, supra note 21, at 2. Ben was in a coma for 
approximately 24 hours, after which time it was agreed that Ben was brain dead and 
the ventilator should be removed. See Belkin, supra note 21, at 28. 
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carrier.24 What was unusual about this case was that the 
hospital's risk manager did not accept as the cause of death the 
coroner's preliminary assessment of idiosyncratic reaction to the 
anesthesia. 25 Rather, the risk manager conducted a thorough 
investigation, which revealed that Ben had been injected with 
the wrong drug after a mix-up of two different drugs in the 
operating room. 26 After those findings were confirmed by two 
independent laboratories,27 the hospital's risk manager, 
accompanied by the anesthesiologist present at Ben's surgery, 
shared the results with the family and its lawyer.28 
Although the amount of the compensation paid to Ben's 
family is confidential,29 the anesthesiologist, the hospital's 
lawyer, the insurance company's representative, the hospital's 
risk manager, and the family's lawyer have all publicly described 
their collaborative process as aimed at making Martin Memorial 
Hospital a safer place while dealing fairly with this tragic 
accident. 30 The candid and quick disclosure of the results of the 
error in this particular hospital's method of handling drugs led to 
a surprising outcome. The parents were able to question their 
son's caregivers and felt comfortable continuing to use Martin 
Memorial Hospital for health care services. 31 
24. See Belkin, supra note 21, at 28. 
25. See Boodman, supra note 12, at 12 (noting that the coroner found this type 
of reaction to be "extremely rare"). 
26. Knowing that Ben's reaction occurred immediately after the injection of 
lidocaine with epinephrine, hospital staff secured the two syringes, a partially filled 
vial of the drug solution, and an empty vial of adrenaline. See Haas, supra note 21, 
at 3. The risk manager asserted that all syringes and vials were maintained and 
blood samples were kept in case additional testing was necessary. See id. She later 
held several meetings and the possibility of a mix-up of the two drugs was explored. 
See id. at 4. The risk manager was eventually able to reconstruct how the drugs left 
the pharmacy and were tracked through every step of the process. See id. 
27. Tests were performed at the University of Georgia and at National Medical 
Services in Willow Grove, Pennsylvania, using different testing techniques. See 
Haas, supra note 21, at 3-5. Both labs found that the syringe contained a topical 
adrenaline instead of an anesthetic. See id. 
28. See id. at 6. 
29. See Boodman, supra note 12, at 12 (stating that the parties agreed to keep 
the amount of the settlement secret, but that the payment exceeded $250,000, 
Florida's statutory maximum for noneconomic damages). 
30. For example, in October 1996, a panel discussion of the Martin Memorial 
Hospital case was the centerpiece of the discussions at a conference addressing ways 
to reduce medical errors, which was organized by the American Medical Association, 
the Joint Commission on Accreditation ofHealthcare Organizations, and others. See 
Doug Levy, Helping Hospitals Learn from Tragic Mistakes, USA TODAY, Nov. 5, 
1996, at 6D. For a thorough recounting of her personal role as the chief investigator 
of this incident, see Haas, supra note 21. 
3L See Belkin, supra note 21, at 28 (commenting that the risk manager was 
"grateful and amazed" at the parents' reaction). 
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More important, the hospital acknowledged not only to the 
family, but also to its professional peers, that it had changed its 
methods of handling drugs. 32 Interestingly enough, no 
professional was disciplined or sued.33 In the lingo of the current 
reform movement, the death of Ben Kolb was the result of a 
"latent system" failure in the way drugs were labeled, 
distributed, and handled in the hospital.34 From this very 
inspiring story of professionals working together, it is apparent 
that for reformers, systems thinking means conceptualizing the 
"mistake" in terms of the interaction of all the human actors and 
the technology from the point at which both drugs were delivered 
to the hospital pharmacy to the fatal injection of the wrong 
drug.35 
Patient safety means developing processes, such as 
eliminating one of the steps in the drug delivery procedure, in 
order to decrease the likelihood that the same mistake will be 
made in the future.36 Not mentioned by the reformers but implicit 
in the outcome is the willingness of a health care organization, 
namely Martin Memorial Hospital, to pay enough compensation 
to satisfy the family and pay their attorney's fees so that no 
lawsuits were filed against any of the individual professionals 
arguably involved. The Martin Memorial Hospital case arrives at 
32. See Haas, supra note 21, at 5 (revealing that the hospital was no longer 
using intermediate containers, which allowed the opportunity for the wrong drug to 
be drawn into an end-use container, but that the hospital now uses a filter straw, 
which allows for transfer of the drug directly from the vial to the end-use container); 
see also Boodman, supra note 12, at 12 (reporting other changes in drug-handling 
procedures, including that drugs are now transferred one at a time, t\vo nurses must 
observe the transfer and verify the contents, topical adrenaline is never drawn into a 
syringe, and no vials can be discarded until surgery is over and the patient is stable). 
33. See Boodman, supra note 12, at 12 (noting that the nurses involved in Ben's 
death are still working at the hospital and that all had unblemished records). 
34. In a statement made at the October 1996 conference on ways to reduce 
medical errors, the Kolb family's lawyers indicated that they were e.A"Ploring a 
products liability claim against the manufacturers despite the settlement with the 
hospital: "In representing this family, we try to make a difference. From a products 
liability standpoint, even though our investigation is in its infancy, we have 
developed some theories that we think together will make a change in the way the 
medications commonly used together, are packaged and sold." Statement of the Law 
firm of Krupnick, Campbell, Malone, Roselli, Buser, Slama & Hancock (on file with 
the author and the Houston Law Review). 
35. See, e.g., Leape, Error in Medicine, supra note 13, at 1854 (stating that 
"responsible individuals at each stage [must] think through the consequences of 
their decisions and . . . reason back from discovered deficiencies to redesign and 
reorganize the process"). 
36. See id. (reasoning that to create a safe process requires attention to 
methods of error reduction at each stage of system development); see also Belkin, 
supra note 21, at 28 (discussing the flawed procedure in the l\fartin Memorial 
Hospital case and stating that "[t]he elimination of one step eliminates one 
opportunity for the human factor to get in the way"). 
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a kind of contractual no-fauW7 solution by which the family of an 
injured patient is adequately compensated, no individual health 
care professional is sued, and the health care organization takes 
systemic steps within its organization to prevent similar 
accidents and shares its "learning" with other health care 
providers. However, legal scholarship is not built upon visions, so 
systems thinking and patient safety could mean numerous things 
to lawyers, and this engenders the problem of definitions. 
A. Patient Safety, Medical Error, and Prevention of Injury 
Patient safety advocates and tort reform theorists have their 
respective notions of safety, as well as related notions of medical 
error and prevention of injury. Patient safety advocates' 
definitions emphasize the processes of health care: patient safety 
is "the avoidance, prevention, and amelioration of adverse 
outcomes or InJuries stemming from the processes of 
healthcare."38 The adverse outcomes or injuries include "errors," 
"deviations," and "accidents."39 
Modern tort theorists, on the other hand, have an explicit 
concern with the "safety" of the health system, but aim their 
analyses at the legal system's response to actual adverse patient 
outcomes. Starting with the seminal works of law-and-economics 
scholars such as Guido Calabresi and Richard Posner, most modern 
tort theorists acknowledge that there is a connection between 
safety-prevention of future injuries-and other goals, such as the 
compensation of injured patients. 40 Within this tradition of legal 
reformist scholarship, patient safety is defined in terms of the costs 
and benefits of preventing the injury, presumably in some general 
or systemic sense.41 The liability system only deals with those 
medical errors that result in injury and are the subject of lawsuits 
or the threat of lawsuits. The hope of this modern analysis is that a 
37. Refer to supra note 7 (discussing the no-fault system for compensating 
victims of medically caused injuries). 
38. National Patient Safety Foundation at the American Medical Association, 
Agenda for Research and Development in Patient Safety (last modified May 24, 1999) 
<http://www.ama-assn.org/med-sci.npsf/research/research.htm>. 
39. See id. 
40. See KOMESAR, supra note 18, at 154 (discussing Judge Calabresi's work, 
which has recognized that there is a "trade·off between the costs of unprevented 
harm and the costs of preventing that harm"). Judge Posner expanded upon Judge 
Calabresi's ideas, arguing that "the logic of negligence law could be found in resource 
allocation efficiency and economic analysis." See id. at 155. 
41. See, e.g., id. at 155 (discussing safety in terms of the famous Judge Learned 
Hand formula, which defines negligence in terms of costs and benefits of prevention: 
if the burden of taking the safety step is greater than the probability of mishap 
multiplied by the loss if the mishap occurs (B < p x L), then there is negligence). 
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"rational" response to patient injury will influence health care 
providers to develop "safer" practices. 
The apparent conflict between the tort theorists' and the 
advocates' definitions of safety is resolved by one of the critics of 
the law-and-economics approach to tort reform. Neil Komesar 
notes that tort reformers focus solely on the process of 
adjudication-the liability model-and its many limitations.42 
Discovery of a limitation in the liability model-for instance, that 
it does not adequately deter future injury-leads tort reformers 
to suggest modifications of judicial liability doctrines or 
legislative modification of liability systems, such as statutory 
limits on the amount of damages that can be recovered or even 
no-fault patient compensation.43 Tort reformers fail to consider 
that legislative tinkering with the liability system will 
necessarily create another imperfect solution to the patient 
safety problem. For Komesar, the important issue is to try to 
determine which legal or nonlegal institutions achieve the 
socially optimal level of patient safety and health care!• He 
posits that resolving that issue requires a comparison of the 
strengths and weaknesses of imperfect institutional processes of 
enhancing safety in the health care system: 
Safety is a goal choice; tort liability is a law or public 
policy choice. No goal choice standing on its own dictates 
law or public policy choices. The goal of safety is 
consistent with a wide variety of law and public policy 
choices .... Put in institutional terms, depending on the 
setting, optimal safety might be achieved by tort liability 
through the adjudicative process, by regulation through 
the political process, or by transactions through the 
market process. The link between goals and law and 
public policy results is institutional choice.":; 
Komesar's insight allows for acceptance of the social goal of 
patient safety as envisioned by the Martin Memorial Hospital 
case, while bearing in mind the problem of determining the 
appropriate institutional arrangement for optimizing safety 
within health care. 
42. See id. at 154-56. 
43. See PAUL C. WEILER, 1:1EDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 31-32, 70-92, 132-
58 (1991) (exploring the prevention impact of malpractice litigation as well as 
discussing statutory limits on damages and detailing and endorsing no-fault patient 
compensation). 
44. See KOMESAR, supra note 18, at 6, 153-55 (discussing the application of his 
general research question of whether "the market is better or worse than its 
available alternatives or the political process is better or worse" to safety issues}. 
45. Id. at 155. 
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Distinguishing patient safety as a social goal from the choice 
of a legal or nonlegal strategy to achieve that goal clarifies the 
definitional issues in the term "medical error." Lucian Leape uses 
medical error to refer to a broad category of phenomena. 46 At one 
level, the term clearly encompasses those events that lead to 
patient injury, as in the Martin Memorial Hospital case.47 But it 
also includes routine, nonconsequential errors: Leape and his 
colleagues use medical error to mean those mishaps or deviations 
from proper practice that do not result in substantial harm, let 
alone a lawsuit.48 For example, a physician writes a prescription 
for a one-percent solution of a drug, but the pharmacist misreads 
the physician's handwriting and prepares a ten-percent solution. 
The nurse who is to administer the medication notices the 
unusually high concentration and brings her concern to the 
attention of the prescribing physician. The prescribing physician 
then corrects the dosage. Under prevailing practices in most 
health care organizations in this country, there is no formal 
reporting of this "near miss." However, to the safety prevention 
researcher this would be important data to collect in order to 
reduce or prevent the number of drug medication "errors" in 
hospitals and nursing homes.49 
Responding to the near miss might be thought of as an 
aspect of quality improvement,50 but to confuse the safety 
problem in medicine with the current debate on improving 
quality in health care ignores the dynamic potential of the public 
safety advocates. To paraphrase Justice Stewart's famous 
observation about obscenity,51 we do not know what patient 
safety is because we do not yet have a method to translate 
information about reported patient injuries into meaningful 
strategies for detecting near misses and deviations from safe 
protocols that do not result in patient injury. The airline 
46. See Leape, Error in Medicine, supra note 13, at 1853-57 (describing errors 
committed because of skill level, misperception, lack of knowledge, system design, 
poor maintenance, and inadequate management). 
47. See id. at 1851-52. 
48. See id. at 1851 (stating that "most errors do no harm" because the error is 
intercepted or the patient's natural defenses prevent injury). 
49. See id. (advocating a national error-reporting system that would include 
near misses as a way to improve health care safety). 
50. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N REP., supra note 5, at 155-59 (calling for the 
establishment of an error-reporting system modeled in part on the Aviation Safety 
Reporting System). "A system of continuous quality improvement committed to 
preventing [medical] errors and correcting them when they do occur is a vital step in 
improving the quality of care in the United States." Id. at 156. Refer to note 16 
supra. 
51. "I know it when I see it." Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) 
(Stewart, J., concurring). 
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metaphor for patient safety is merely a reminder that there may 
be systems of error reporting, regulation, adjudication, and 
implementation of technological innovations that can change the 
"safety record" of health care. At the moment, however, there is 
no evidence that the type of institutional arrangement in place to 
promote safety in aviation or other industries could, or more 
important should, be applied to health care. 
To ensure that these important questions remain open, 
patient safety is defined as follows: the continuous efforts of 
actors within the institutions of medicine and law to reduce the 
level of iatrogenic patient injury62 through the systemic 
understanding of how errors are reduced. This definition of 
patient safety has two features that distinguish it from the 
definitions of safety proposed by both patient safety advocates 
and tort reformers. First, I join with Komesar in recognizing 
patient safety as a worthwhile social goal that could be pursued 
through a variety oflegal and nonlegal institutions.63 Second, the 
definition acknowledges the need for a new understanding of all 
the potential risks that never come to the attention of either 
medical or legal officials, but it does not explicitly embrace the 
patient safety advocates' position that aviation or any other 
industry provides the model for reduction of risks in health care. 
The patient safety advocates' position can be contrasted with 
that of the tort reformists' by comparing their respective views of 
the world of errors. 
Tort reformers, according to Komesar, analyze only the tip of 
the iceberg to make pronouncements about safety and law.M 
52. Paul Weiler defines medical or iatrogenic injury as "an UDeA"}lected or 
avoidable adverse event, as opposed to an inevitable or anticipated traumatic 
byproduct of necessary treatment." Paul C. Weiler, The Case for No-Fault Medical 
Liability, 52 :Mn. L. REv. 908, 912 n.22 (1993). 
53. Refer to notes 44-45 supra and accompanying text. 
54. See Ko:MESAR, supra note 18, at 154-56. 
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Under their view, the sinking of the Titanic provides an 
opportunity to discuss the positive or ill effects of imposing 
liability on ship owners as a means of preventing future mishaps 
with icebergs. Patient safety advocates argue that icebergs are 
always a risk of boating, so the first tool of prevention would be 
the development of a system of near misses of ships running into 
icebergs. The essential assumption behind this theory, which 
compels acknowledgement, is that near misses are very similar 
to actual accidents such as the Titanic hitting an iceberg. The 
patient safety advocates, however, do not have a theory of health 
care as delivered through complex organizations rather than by a 
mechanical system steered by the physician and his or her 
underlings. 
B. Medical Liability as a System of Prevention 
To be open to the lack of a role for traditional malpractice 
liability in the patient safety issue, one must also acknowledge 
the equal possibility that there is such a relationship. Even prior 
to the Harvard Medical Practice Study, leading law-and-
economics scholars had noted a relationship between the 
possibility of tort liability and safety. 55 Other scholars may 
question this relationship,56 but one need not resolve this 
longstanding debate. Both sides of the debate bring forth a prior 
ideological commitment that is often invisible and clearly not yet 
adopted as a matter of public policy. The more important point is 
to elucidate the social goals, matters of law, and public policy 
choices of medical liability. 
The legal scholars associated with the Harvard Medical 
Practice Study have argued that the medical liability system's 
goals of redistributing the costs of accidents and providing 
incentives for accident prevention could be better achieved 
55. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 17-20 (1970) (recognizing that liability under accident law is 
used to balance safety and economic cost); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of 
Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 73 (1972) (observing that "[t]he rules of liability 
seem to have been broadly designed to bring about the efficient ... level of accidents 
and safety"). 
56. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO 
HEALTH CARE? 384-89 (1997) (questioning the tort liability system's capability to 
efficiently process claims, which negatively affects its capacity for deterrence). For a 
critique of Epstein's views on malpractice, see Gary T. Schwartz, Medical 
Malpractice, Tort, Contract, and Managed Care, 1998 U. ILL. L. REv. 885 
(concluding that Epstein's contract recommendations in malpractice situations is 
innovative yet fails to consider the "dramatic" modern movement towards managed 
care). 
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through a system of "no fault. ,:;7 By positing two social goals-
compensation and prevention-no-fault advocates can engage in 
a kind of "balancing" to form their policy recommendation of 
eliminating liability for medical injuries in the interest of 
promoting or optimizing patient safety.68 This type of cost-benefit 
analysis is appealing because it is the kind of analysis judges 
often do when they manipulate tort doctrines, even in the 
medical malpractice context.59 
The no-fault analysis, however, is not useful to the patient 
safety debate for two reasons. First, the patient safety movement 
(if indeed it is a social movement) posits only one goal: prevention 
of injuries. When translated into a law or public policy position, 
this means that the issue of compensation is set aside without 
losing sight of the fact that compensation might be important to 
others, such as potential consumers of health care and the 
plaintiffs trial bar whose fees are usually paid from the recovery 
of damages.60 In the actual political process, there might be some 
compromise between measures designed for prevention and those 
aimed at compensation, but from an analytical standpoint, safety 
is the only goal. How to achieve safety through political action or 
regulatory changes of health care is yet another question. The no-
fault balancing reform confuses social goals with analyses of the 
processes of change-the political process. 
Second, the evidence available from studies of limited no-
fault systems for medical accidents indicates that the complete 
elimination of litigation of claims is nearly impossible.61 Virginia 
and Florida both enacted legislation in the late 1980s designed to 
57. See, e.g., WEILER, supra note 43, at 134-50 {arguing that a no-fault system 
would provide wider and more generous compensation, result in significant savings 
in administrative costs, and retain adequate deterrence and preventative 
incentives). 
58. See, e.g., id. at 149 (positing that the "prevention role" of a program will 
give health care organizations an incentive to learn about and correct injuries and 
their causes rather than simply blaming errant individuals through malpractice 
litigation). 
59. See, e.g., Areta v. Avedon, 585 P.2d 598, 607 {Cal. 1993) {applying a cost-
benefit analysis in an informed consent action and holding that a doctor was not 
required to inform a cancer patient of his statistical life eA"}lectancy); KOMESAR, 
supra note 18, at 155-56 (appropriating Judge Hand's classic cost-benefit formula to 
support his thesis of the "link [between] negligence liability, resource allocation 
efficiency, and safety"). 
60. See Bovbjerg & Sloan, supra note 7, at 72-73 {noting that a no-fault system 
could reduce compensation by eliminating punitive damages, payment for 
nonpecuniary loss, and lump sum recoveries, which would ultimately result in lower 
attorney's fees). 
6L See id. at 104 (observing that although a Florida no-fault system for 
specific birth-related injuries reduced tort claims, "a substantial number" of 
permanent injury and death tort claims were still filed). 
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remove severe neurological injuries to newborns from the tort 
system and place these cases in an administrative, no-fault 
system.62 Under both systems, parents of injured babies 
continued to bring lawsuits for a number of reasons: the allegedly 
insufficient compensation amounts,63 the varied interpretations 
of courts allowing for suits to be filed, 64 and the general 
narrowness of the provisions. 65 This multiple-goals analysis of 
medical liability indicates that the political process must fine-
tune any so-called reforms. 66 
Once we focus on the social goal of prevention, it is apparent 
that other systems could be sources of prevention tactics. During 
the so-called malpractice crises of the 1970s and 1980s, certain 
specialties had considerable difficulty obtaining insurance, 
particularly obstetrics and anesthesiology.67 Professionals in one 
of these specialties-anesthesiology-decided to take steps to 
reduce the cost of insurance by reducing the number of 
accidents. 66 In 1984, the formation of the Anesthesia Patient 
Safety Foundation (APSF) led to research and changes that 
reduced the number of anesthetic-related accidents, which tend 
to be extremely costly.69 
The APSF's improvement of anesthesia safety is a good 
example of Komesar's point that the "market" can have more 
62. See id. at 82. 
63. See id. at 90-93 (stating that the Virginia and Florida no-fault statutes lack 
explicit nonpecuniary loss provisions and compensate claimants with scheduled, 
rather than lump sum, payments). 
64. See id. at 84-85, 89 (noting that although both the Florida and Virginia 
statutes state "that no-fault is to be an exclusive remedy," the statutes allow judicial 
review of administrative decisions and many claimants go directly to court to 
determine if no fault replaces the tort remedy). 
65. See id. at 90 (describing the statutory eligibility criteria as "very specific 
and targeted" and "only a partial carve-out from tort"). 
66. See id. at 115 & n.294 (illustrating the recent amendments made to the 
Florida no-fault statute that attempt to bring many tort cases back under the 
statute). 
67. See Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise Medical Liability 
and the Evolution of the American Health Care System, 108 HARV. L. REV. 381, 409-
11 (1994). 
68. See John H. Eichhorn et al., Standards for Patient Monitoring During 
Anesthesia at Harvard Medical School, 256 JAMA 1017, 1017 (1986) (observing that 
upon concern expressed by Harvard Medical School's insurance carrier over rising 
claims related to anesthesia, Harvard appointed a risk management committee to 
improve safety). 
69. See Walter Gellhorn, Medical Malpractice Litigation (U.S.)-Medical 
Mishap Compensation (N.Z.), 73 CORNELL L. REv. 170, 186-87 & n.46 (1988) (noting 
the successful effect of the APSFs error-prevention campaigns). For more 
information on the APSF, see Anesthesia Patient Safety Foundation, APSF 
Foundation Information (visited Oct. 13, 1999) <http://www.gasnet.org/societies/ 
apsf/foundationlfoundation.html>. 
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effect on safety than the law.70 It is not that law is irrelevant to 
safety, but in the APSF example, the market responded without 
any political change to incentives and disincentives to produce a 
more "safe" environment.11 In fact, there has been growth in 
knowledge about how to make the operating room safer by 
changing the configuration of technology, human resources, and 
methods of training anesthesiologists.72 Reaching the goal of 
patient safety requires a paradigm shift in the way we think 
about prevention of accidents in law. Rather than continue the 
debate about liability as instrumental or as an obstacle to 
increased safety in health care, we need to acknowledge that the 
single goal of preventing patient injuries requires a new and 
dynamic way of conceptualizing law so that knowledge about 
safety will continue to grow. In this new view, medical liability-
the imposition of civil liability for damages on health care 
professionals and organizations-is acknowledged to be an 
imperfect system for enhancing patient safety. The goal is not to 
perfect or eliminate medical liability under the banner of 
efficiency or rationality. Rather, the goal of a new 
conceptualization of the role oflaw is to assess the capacity of the 
legal system to adopt new ways of viewing safety. 
C. Public Health Law and the Use of New Knowledge 
To infuse the entire health care system with systemic 
knowledge about reducing the risk of injuries to patients requires 
a new paradigm: public health. Public health law, broadly 
defined, is concerned with the well being of a given population.73 
Although preventing the spread of infectious disease has 
historically been the core function of public health, increasingly 
the social and behavioral aspects of a "healthy lifestyle"-
opposing smoking, violence, and unprotected sexual intercourse 
and promoting designated drivers-are part of the public health 
agenda.74 Some of the most dramatic safety increases in public 
health are in fact simple but systemic changes; for example, 
getting physicians to wash their hands after delivery has greatly 
70. See KOMESAR, supra note 18, at 154. 
7L See Gellhorn, supra note 69, at 186-87 & n.46 (noting a reduction in claims 
against anesthesiologists even in the years preceding the APSF's establishment). 
72. These developments are described in Abraham & Weiler, supra note 67, at 
412-13. 
73. See, e.g., Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., The Law and the Public's Health: A 
Study of Infectious Disease Law in the United States, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 59, 67 
(1999). 
74. See id. at 79-80. 
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decreased infection and death associated with childbirth, 76 and 
good sewage systems have reduced the spread of disease.711 In 
addition, public health measures are based upon scientifically 
derived data about the risks to health.77 
Public health measures, by and large, become "law" through 
legislatively authorized regulatory schemes and are thus 
examples of how law reduces risks to overall health.78 As tools of 
prevention, these regulatory measures are very different from 
the supposed prevention function of tort liability as applied to 
medicine. The tort liability system in medicine is best described 
as a means by which private individuals attempt to exercise 
control over medical professionals and health care organizations. 
Public health is a means by which public officials, in cooperation 
with citizens, seek to harness science and medicine to protect the 
75. For an early illustration of systems thinking applied to medical care, see 
generally the work of Hungarian physician, Ignaz Semmelweis (1818·1865), who 
discovered the cause of puerperal ("childbed") fever and introduced antisepsis into 
medical practice. See SHERWIN B. NULAND, DOCTORS: THE BIOGRAPHY OF MEDICINE 
244-46 (1988). Semmelweis noted that poor women who gave birth in hospitals had a 
much higher incidence of mortality than well-to-do women who gave birth at homo 
or even others who self-delivered in alleyways and streets. See id. at 245. 
Semmelweis followed the cause of the higher mortality rate back to the lack of hand 
washing on the part of medical students and physicians performing the deliveries. 
See id. at 246. 
76. See Gostin et al., supra note 73, at 78-79 (describing the early sanitation 
reformers' agenda that focused on sewer line improvement and stating that "purity 
of water supplies" is an important traditional public health practice). For a 
fictionalized account of a public health issue-contaminated public baths-and tho 
professional and public reactions to remedying the problem, see Henrik Ibsen, An 
Enemy of the People (1883), reprinted in HENRIK IBSEN, THE COMPLETE MAJOR 
PROSE PLAYS 277-386 (RolfFjelde Trans., Farrar Straus Giroux, 1st ed. 1978). 
77. In fact, when legislatures give public health officials the authority to 
impose sanctions against individuals, the Constitution requires that there be n 
scientific basis for legislative enactment of public health measures as exercises of tho 
police power. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24-25, 30-31 (1905) 
(holding that a state legislature is within its police power in establishing n public 
health vaccination statute based upon an "effective" scientific theory). In Jacobson, 
the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a state law that authorized local 
towns to require vaccination when necessary for public health and safety and 
authorized a fine for adults who refused. See id. at 12-13, 39. An interesting aspect 
of Jacobson is that, at the time, some medical professionals did not believe tho 
particular vaccination that the state used prevented the spread of small pox. See id. 
at 30. The Court stated that the legislature was entitled to choose among competing 
theories of preventing the spread of the disease. See id. 
78. It is important to distinguish between health and health care to 
understand some of the issues, particularly the behavior issue, on the public health 
agenda. For instance, decreasing the amount of smoking among a given population 
raises the overall health status of that population without any increase in tho 
amount of health care for lung cancer in that population. See, e.g., Lester Breslow & 
William G. Cumberland, Progress and Objectives in Cancer Control, 259 JAMA 1690, 
1690, 1692 (1988). 
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health of the community.79 Although coercion is used, public 
health relies heavily upon education and voluntary cooperation 
as the primary means of obtaining compliance.80 Even though the 
system of public health law regarding its core function of 
preventing communicable disease is in disarray, 81 a shift to a 
public health paradigm highlights the unique problems of public 
safety. 
The risk to patient safety is not in some "disease" process 
that can be studied and objectified by medical and public health 
professionals. Rather, the subjects of study in patient safety are 
health care professionals and the tools they choose to do their 
work. Making health care the subject of intense scientific study is 
not likely to be achieved without the voluntary cooperation of 
professionals within the health care system. 
III. COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND 
PROFESSIONAL KNOWLEDGE 
At the present time, knowledge about patient safety is in an 
embryonic stage, but the larger universe of knowledge about risk 
reduction is more developed. Systemic tbjnlcing about prevention 
of patient injury requires the creation of new kinds of knowledge 
that are embedded within organizations rather than individuals. 
In health care organizations, the kind of knowledge that is 
valued is "professional knowledge," meaning that it is derived 
from some scientific body of knowledge.S2 Yet there is another 
tradition of professionalism, less aligned with a positivist 
interpretation, that the patient safety movement evokes. This 
79. See, e.g., Gostin et al., supra note 73, at 61 (extolling the use of both 
scientific inquiry and the law as methods by which norms of healthy behavior are 
established). 
80. See id. at 120. 
8L See id. at 88-101 (discussing three challenges to health law's goal of 
preventing communicable diseases: the decline in public health funding and 
increasing public apathy, the emergence of new treatment-intensive communiCJJble 
diseases, and the advent of managed care). 
82. In describing this dominant mode of thinking about the nature of 
professional knowledge as "technical rationality," Donald Schon provides a critique 
of positivism. He writes: 
Technical Rationality is the heritage of Positivism, the powerful 
philosophical doctrine that grew up in the nineteenth century as an account 
of the rise of science and technology and as a social movement aimed at 
applying the achievements of science and technology to the well-being of 
manlcind. Technical Rationality is the Positivist epistemology of practice. 
SCHON, REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER, supra note 17, at 31. See generally id. at 22-69 
(discussing the nature and limitations of "Technical Rationality," or instrumental, 
science-based problem-solving, and proposing "Reflection-in-Action," an intuitive, 
action-based method, as an alternative). 
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other tradition of professionalism in health care is patient-
centered and modernly places a great deal of emphasis on patient 
autonomy.83 This avocational aspect of caring for patients is best 
epitomized in the notions of caring for the dying.84 The patient 
safety movement seeks to invoke this sense of professionalism in 
encouraging health care professionals to question the adversarial 
assumptions of the liability model and to speak the "truth" about 
medical error. 
Thus infused with the liability model, patient safety 
advocates tend to see issues in terms of liability without 
considering the variety of options available in law or public 
policy. The regulation of health care is complex, and it is not 
surprising that on close examination, the model of liability fails 
to point to the correct empirical questions or to place the patient 
safety movement into proper historical context. Most important, 
the liability model fails to consider that many of the present legal 
protections physicians and health care organizations enjoy may 
in fact inhibit efforts to improve patient safety. 
As an example, consider the relationship of the process of 
accrediting health care facilities to the promotion of patient 
safety. At present, the Joint Commission for Accreditation of 
Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) determines on a regular 
basis if a hospital should be accredited, and it uses a nominally 
"voluntary" process that certifies that the hospital meets certain 
standards and is presumably "safe."85 But without JCAHO 
accreditation, a hospital cannot receive payment from 
government or private reimbursement programs, such as 
83. See generally LARRY I. PALMER, LAW, MEDICINE, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 34· 
38 (1989) (proposing an alternative to the informed consent model of physician· 
patient decision making, which emphasizes a collaborative, rather than a 
contractual, approach). 
84. How this ethical objection is enforced within the legal system has created 
considerable conceptual difficulties. See, e.g., Wright v. Johns Hopkins Health Sys. 
Corp., 728 A2d 166, 167, 171 (Md. 1999) (holding that the estate could not recover 
damages from health care professionals for administering cardiopulmonary 
resuscitation contrary to the written advance directive of an AIDS patient). Some of 
the confusion is a function of trying to understand the nature of the "right" to refuse 
treatment. The plaintiffs in Wright tried to argue that the patient had either a 
common law, statutory, or constitutional right that the physician had ignored. See 
id. at 167-68 (referencing Maryland's Life-Sustaining Procedures Act, which governs 
directives of health care). The court held in effect that this right was a function of 
statutory enactment, and the lack of certification by two physicians that his 
condition was "terminal," as required by the statute, was fatal to any claim of 
negligence. See id. at 175. 
85. See Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations 
(JCAHO), Joint Commission Mission and History (visited Jan. 20, 2000) 
<http://www.jcaho.org/mandh_frm.html> (noting the voluntary nature of 
accreditation). 
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Medicare or indemnity health insurance programs. sa The JCAHO 
in fact wields considerable power and is best thought of as a 
quasi-political body. Not surprisingly, as the media have given 
more attention to prevention of patient injury,87 the JCAHO has 
modified its standards about reporting adverse incidents-what 
are called "sentinel events."88 One recent change was the 
implementation of a standard that encouraged healthcare 
organizations to voluntarily provide the JCAHO with a copy of 
the document analyzing the systemic cause or causes of the 
sentinel event, called a "root cause analysis," along with 
corrective plans. 89 
Some professional organizations with seats on the JCAHO 
board objected to this policy on the grounds that once disclosed, 
these reports might be discoverable in a future lawsuit by the 
injured party.90 One might wonder why giving a patient an 
explanation of why he or she was injured along with the steps the 
hospital is taking to prevent future occurrences is perceived as a 
grave risk to the organization. One explanation is that health 
care organizations benefit from some legislative protection 
against the usual rules of discovery in most states-protection 
believed to be necessary for "peer review" and "quality assurance" 
programs. 91 Health care organizations are not willing to risk their 
86. See iiL (noting that Congress passed the Social Security Amendments of 
1965 with a provision that hospitals accredited by the JCAHO are able to participate 
in Medicare and Medicaid programs); see also WILLIAM J. CURRAN ET AL., HEALTH 
CARE LAW AND ETHICS 1192-93 (5th ed. 1998) (stating that Medicare and Medicaid 
certification are vital to an organization's financial health). 
87. See, e.g., Belkin, supra note 21, at 28 (discussing the need for systemic 
change to prevent patient injury in the context of several case studies of medical 
error); Atul Gawande, When Doctors Make Mistakes, NEW YORKER, Feb. 1, 1999, at 
40, 48-49 (relating instances of doctor error and describing a weekly intrabospital 
conference held to address and correct them); J.M. Sharfstein, Asleep on the Job, 
NEW REPUBLIC, June 21, 1999, at 17, 17-18 (recommending a reduction in resident 
work hours to reduce patient injury); see also, e.g., Sandeep Jauhar, Z..f.D., First, Do 
No Harm: When Patients Suffer, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1999, at F8 (cataloguing 
incidences of inefficient or dangerous health care and suggesting that less aggressive 
treatment methods are safer). 
88. See JCAHO, Sentinel Events Policy and Procedures (last modified June 15, 
1999) <http://wwwb.jcaho.org/sentineVse_pp.html> (explaining that uneA-pected 
instances of patient injury are called "sentinel" because "they signal the need for 
immediate investigation and response"). 
89. See iiL 
90. For instance, the American Hospital Association and the American 
Society for Healthcare Risk Management opposed the policy. See American 
Society for Healthcare Risk Management, Position Statement and 
Recommendations: JCAHO Sentinel Event Reporting Program (visited Jan. 20, 
2000) <http://www.ashrm.org/newsljcaho/blast3co.html> [hereinafter ASHRM, 
Position Statement] (stating that the ASHRM believes that the JCAHO policy places 
complying organizations at risk of financial and reputational damage). 
9L See, e.g., Scripps Mem'l Hasp. v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 725, 725 
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legislative privileges in order to comply with a JCAHO request 
ostensibly aimed at preventing patient injury.92 The linkage 
between the rules for accreditation and legal discovery assumes 
that the adjudication of malpractice claims should predominate 
over other institutional perspectives. 
The patient safety perspective would start with an analysis 
that sees the JCAHO as "law related" but primarily aligned with 
political or administrative institutions rather than with courts 
and the process of adjudication. Analyzing the JCAHO's recent 
actions as part of political institutional analysis, the change in 
policy is explained as an attempt to ward off regulatory or 
legislative responses to "medical error." By offering to use its 
influence to get more safety-related information, the JCAHO 
hopes to maintain its own position as mediator between health 
care organizations and political and administrative units of the 
state. Or, to put the matter in terms of public choice theory, the 
goal of the JCAHO is to maintain the political status of the 
accreditation function it now exercises.93 
In less cynical terms, the JCAHO's modification of its 
standards dealing with sentinel events is a signal that political 
institutions may be seeking a new equilibrium with health care. 
The legislative privileges obtained during previous periods of 
"malpractice crisis"94 are no longer considered sacred. 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that to allow the subpoena of hospital peer review 
records for the purpose of impeaching an expert witness in a criminal trial would 
subvert the legislature's intent to provide a broad privilege against such discovery). 
92. See, e.g., ASHRM, Position Statement, supra note 90. 
93. There also exists a wide variety of theories about how to analyze the 
political process in law. For a description of those theories, see WILLIAM N. 
ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: 
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PuBLIC POLICY 43-66 (2d ed. 1995) (discussing the 
mechanics of several theories of the legislative process: proceduralist (how a bill 
becomes a law), interest group (the influence of political groups), and institutional 
(broad governmental structures)). 
94. Nearly every state has some type of statute protecting records from 
internal hospital review proceedings of patient injuries from discovery or admission 
into evidence. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-445, 36-445.01 (West 1993); 
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1157 (West 1995); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6527 (McKinney 1985) 
(relating a law prohibiting the disclosure of medical review records); TEX. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE ANN.§ 161.032 (West 1992 & Supp. 1999) (making medical committee 
records confidential and not subject to subpoena); see also Scripps Mem'l Hosp., 44 
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 726-27 (discussing California's enactment of legislative privileges 
against discovery in 1968 and significant amendments made in the mid-1980s that 
limited the privileges' scope). Congress sought to encourage these professional 
review activities through the enactment of the Health Quality Improvement Act of 
1986, Pub. L. 99-660, tit. IV, § 401, 101 Stat. 3784 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1101(5)) 
(proclaiming that "[t]here is an overriding national need to provide incentive and 
protection for physicians engaging in effective professional review"). The 
effectiveness of this federal and state legislation in promoting "quality assurance" in 
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Furthermore, judicial attitudes toward privileges may be 
changing because the costs of litigation over the scope of these 
privileges are viewed as excessive as arbitration and other means 
for settling disputes are developed.9~ More important, the 
JCAHO's new policy might become an incentive for health care 
organizations to free themselves from the medical liability 
paradigm. 
Consider again the Martin Memorial Hospital case.00 In that 
instance, the hospital gave the plaintiffs and their lawyers what 
was in effect a root cause analysis as described in JCAHO 
policy.97 The hospital's purpose in waiving its legal right to keep 
the document confidential, and offering an apology for the 
accident, was to induce the plaintiffs to settle the case.98 There 
was, of course, some risk that the plaintiffs would not agree on a 
settlement figure, but obviously the organization was willing to 
take that risk to achieve its organizational goal of quickly 
restoring public confidence in the safety of the hospital.ro If an 
organization is willing to deal candidly with the injured patient 
in terms of future injury prevention, there is no legal risk to 
providing the accreditation organization with its root cause 
analysis. Apparently, the hospital and its insurer were more 
interested in reducing the amount of overall economic loss than 
in "winning" the lawsuit under the rules of adjudication.1'"" 
Additionally, there is no empirical evidence to support the 
claim that the privileges obtained through legislative lobbying 
have in fact made hospitals safer for patients. The reason for this 
health care has been criticized by one of Lucian Leape's co-investigators in the 
Harvard Medical Practice Study. See Troyen A Brennan, Hospital Peer Reuiew and 
Clinical Priuileges Actions: To Report or Not to Report, 28 JAMA 381, 381 (1999). 
95. See, e.g., Goodwich v. Nolan, 680 A2d 1040, 1042-43 {Md. 1996J 
(considering the privilege issue in the conteA-t of the arbitration of a medical 
malpractice claim). 
96. Refer to notes 21-35 supra and accompanying teA-t. 
97. See Haas, supra note 21, at 2-6 (documenting the hospital's efforts at 
finding the "root cause"). 
98. See id. at 6 (observing that the risk manager's candor in disclosing the 
hospital error "stunned" the victim's family and that a settlement was reached 
shortly thereafter); see also Jonathan R. Cohen, Aduising a Client to Apologize, 72 S. 
CAL. L. REv. 1009, 1011-12 nn. 7-8 (1999) (citing the effects of a lack of an apology on 
the propensity of patients to sue for malpractice). 
99. Refer to notes 30-35 supra and accompanying te.'\.1; (describing the positive 
effects of public acknowledgement of the hospital's error). 
100. One of the implications of the approach suggested in this Article is that the 
entire process of settling cases of alleged malpractice should be studied from a 
"systems thinking" perspective. The prominent role of the risk manager in the 
Martin Memorial Hospital case points out the need to study the interaction of 
lawyers, risk managers, and insurance representatives in settling cases from a 
patient safety perspective. Refer to notes 25-28 supra and accompanying te.'\.t. 
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assertion is that the "privilege," when asserted on behalf of a 
corporate entity such as a hospital, does not in fact protect 
organizational knowledge about the nature of errors within that 
particular facility.101 Rather, the privilege protects the knowledge 
that is skewed by the process of litigation, which possesses its 
own particular notion of "cause" and rules for presenting 
evidence to the jury. Although this external perspective on the 
cause of injury is an important constraint on health care 
professionals, consider the possibility that the organization as an 
organization knows very little about what causes injuries. 
Most important, as pointed out by the Harvard Medical 
Practice Study, the amount of litigation over adverse patient 
outcomes is clearly not a complete picture of the amount of 
"malpractice," not to mention the number of near misses so often 
praised as the advantage of the aviation reporting systems.102 But 
the Harvard study's findings have larger theoretical implications 
in terms of comparative institutional analysis. 
The litigation process is always based upon a skewed 
distribution of true rates of injury because there are barriers to 
entry into the adjudication process, 103 which like all institutional 
processes, is imperfect in its attempts at achieving safety. Thus, 
the real problem is which admittedly "imperfect institution" 
should be allowed to balance the costs and benefits of safety.104 
Choosing the least detrimental institution requires some 
empirical evidence and a willingness to set forth the value 
premises driving the institutional choice.105 Because we already 
have some evidence that adjudication does not appropriately 
accommodate the number of "negligent" injuries that occur/00 
10L See, e.g., TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.§ 161.032 (West 1992 & Supp. 
1999) (specifically exempting from the privilege records made in the regular course 
of business); see also, e.g., Bush v. Dolan, 540 N.Y.S.2d 21, 23 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) 
(concluding that the privilege only applies to information obtained in the course of 
the hospital's review proceedings); Barnes v. Whittington, 751 S.W.2d 493, 495-96 
(Tex. 1988) (holding that the privilege for hospital committee records extends only to 
documents generated by the committee in its investigation process). 
102. See Localio et al., supra note 8, at 245 (concluding that litigation rarely 
identifies substandard health care providers or compensates victinls). Refer to notes 
48-50 supra and accompanying text (stressing the importance of reporting "near 
misses," as the airline industry has done, in improving patient safety); see also 
generally To Err Is Human, supra note 16. 
103. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 1-3 (listing the numerous rules dealing with a 
commencement of action, pleadings and motions, parties, and depositions and 
discovery, all of which carry substantial burdens). 
104. See KOMESAR, supra note 18, at 156. 
105. See, e.g., id. at 171-77 (using an economic analysis to evaluate institutional 
responses to product liability based upon the economic and social characteristics of 
those responses). 
106. See Localio et al., supra note 8, at 245 (finding that litigation "infrequently" 
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why should adjudication over medical injuries provide the model 
for prevention of injuries? 
Furthermore, adjudication is, when viewed objectively, 
concerned with the post-injury state of the world. Prevention, on the 
other hand, seeks to affect the pre-injury world. Legal scholars 
arguably have little knowledge about the pre-injury world in health 
care organizations because the debate over the liability or 
adjudicatory process has so dominated our thinking. From the 
perspective of generating new knowledge, the handling of potential 
litigation (which is often years away) is analytically a distinct 
function from safety improvement. If actors within the health care 
organization are only concerned with adjudicative consequences, 
not only are safety solutions often ignored, but the actors also lack a 
framework for asking questions about systemic safety issues. 
The generation of new knowledge begins with questions 
about systems processes, not about who is responsible for injury. 
Responsibility for injury is a socially defined process that may or 
may not make a given procedure safer. The attractiveness of the 
aviation-reporting model should not foster ignorance of the fact 
that when passengers are injured or killed, there is an 
independent liability system for compensating the victims or 
their family members.107 That is, those who administer the 
reporting system for aviation do not have the authority to grant 
immunity to anyone when there has been an injury, death, or 
serious damage to an aircraft.109 The investigation into the causes 
of airline accidents by other government agencies can be used in 
subsequent litigation and might encourage settlements rather 
than prolong litigation.109 In some cases, such as the 1996 crash of 
the ValuJet plane into the Florida Everglades, criminal charges 
have been brought against certain corporate and individual 
actors.110 
compensates medical malpractice victims). 
107. See Charles E. Billings & William D. Reynard, Human Factors in Aircraft 
Incidents: Results of a 7-Year Study, 55 AVIATION, SPACE & ENVTL. 1\f.ED. 960, 961 
(1984) (noting that the potential liability associated with "every accident" may 
complicate investigation). 
108. But see id. (commenting that the FAA offers a "limited waiver of sanctions" 
for the reporting of certain violations). 
109. For example, after the Canadian investigation of the cause of a SwissAir 
crash in September 1998 discovered some evidence of faulty wiring in the plane, 
SwissAir and the manufacturer of the aircraft; agreed, in an unusual move, to accept 
responsibility for the accident despite the fact that the exact cause of the accident 
had not yet been determined. See Anthony Ramirez, SwissAir and Boeing to Split 
Payment of Damages in Crash, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1999, at B6 (reporting that 
SwissAir and Boeing hoped that the action would speed claims settlement and 
compensation to the victims' families). 
110. See Rick Bragg, Politics Hinted in ValuJet·Crash Charges, N.Y. TIMES, 
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From the perspective of safety, it is not clear whether any of 
the reforms that health care professionals hail as necessary, such 
as damages limitations or the heavy reliance on custom evidence 
in malpractice actions, increases the market forces for safety.111 
Similarly, it is equally unclear whether the medical liability 
system increases the amount of safety or provides incentives for 
actions of prevention in the pre-injury world of health care 
delivery.112 The issue is whether some institution-for instance, a 
legislature-is convinced that some new institution-such as a 
regulatory agency-would increase the margin of patient safety 
within an acceptable cost range. 113 The answer to that question is 
not solely theoretical, but obtained by careful assessment of the 
relative strengths and weaknesses of the institutional 
alternatives, including allowing market forces to operate. 
"Market forces" do not simply mean economic costs, but all 
forces driving actors in the health care system. These forces 
include the sense of professionalism of various actors and 
prospective patient demands and preferences as well as costs. As 
systems thinking about medical errors continues to be part of the 
media's portrayal of health care, 114 the general public's image of 
medicine could be changing. The public perception that a single 
bad outcome, such as the wrong foot being amputated, means 
that the responsible health care facility is "unsafe" drives the 
action of managers.115 At a public relations level, health care 
organizations may have to demonstrate that they practice "safe 
medicine." At a scholarly level, researchers from various 
disciplines must join in a multidisciplinary effort to generate new 
July 15, 1999, at A12 (stating that third-degree murder and manslaughter charges 
were being pursued against an aircraft maintenance company); see also Matthew L. 
Wald, Murder Charges Filed by Florida in ValuJet Crash, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 
1999, at A1 (reporting on the company's shocked response to the "criminaliz[ation] of 
a series of mistakes"); When a Crash Can Be a Crime, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1999, at 
A22 (editorializing against a widespread use of indictments against air industry 
personnel in plane crashes, absent criminal negligence). 
11L See KOMESAR, supra note 18, at 182-85 (arguing that where prevention is 
obtainable, reforms that limit damages will too severely limit recovery and reduce 
the impetus towards preventative measures). 
112. See WEILER, supra note 43, at 70-73 (finding that plausible arguments can 
be made on both sides of the medical liability debate). 
113. See id. at 24-32 (recounting the various considerations of legislatures in 
response to the medical malpractice crisis of the 1970s). 
114. See, e.g., Belkin, supra note 21, at 28 (calling for a change in hospital error 
analysis from a personal liability model to a systems model). 
115. After a highly publicized case in which surgeons removed the wrong foot of 
a diabetic patient in Florida, hospital executives announced sweeping changes in 
their procedures. See Doug Stanley, UGH Reduces Number of Surgeries, TAMPA 
TRIB., Apr. 7, 1995, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Major Newspapers File 
(stating that the hospital would reduce its volume of surgeries by one-fourth). 
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knowledge about patient safety so that policymakers, both public 
and private, can create the appropriate institutional 
arrangements to promote patient safety. That research must 
proceed during a period of uncertainty about the legal framework 
of health care. 
IV. PuBLIC HEALTH, MEDICAL LIABILITY, AND PATIENT SAFETY 
The move from the liability model to the public health model 
creates a great deal of legal uncertainty. The liability model 
focuses analytical resources on an institution with which lawyers 
are quite comfortable, and which health care professionals fear-
courts.116 In the past, this perspective has meant that legislative 
reform should correct for the misdeeds of the adjudicatory 
process through damage limitations, 117 arbitration panels, 118 or 
some form of no fault.119 Research under this model operates 
beneath the metaphorical banner of a "blame-free system" that 
would enhance safety.120 
A public health model for patient safety begins with the 
assumption that developing scientific knowledge about the nature 
of medical errors is the most effective way to change the behavior of 
actors. As a result, the coercive instruments of law are to be used 
only as a last resort, and therefore public health pursues a more 
diffuse and pragmatic strategy to achieve the goal of enhancing 
patient safety.121 Sometimes, education-a market strategy-might 
be employed. At other times, seeking the creation of a new 
legislative authority to deal with patient safety might be chosen.122 
116. See, e.g., WEILER, supra note 43, at 6 {describing the lack of familiarity that 
doctors have with courtrooms and their fear of juries' tendencies to sympathize with 
injured patients). 
117. See id. at 31 (detailing the motives of legislatures in limiting damages nnd 
the means by which they have limited damage awards). 
118. See id. at 102 (explaining that more than 12 states have authorized 
pretreatment agreements "in which the patient agrees to accept binding arbitration 
in lieu of a jury trial"). 
119. See, e.g., David M. Studdert et al., Can the United States Afford a 'Wo 
Fault" System of Compensation for Medical Injury?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
Spring 1997, at 1, 1-2 (introducing a comparison of patient compensation costs under 
a liability model and a no-fault model). 
120. See, e.g., Edward A. Dauer & Leonard J. Marcus, Adapting Mediation to 
Link Resolution of Medical Malpractice Disputes with Health Care Quality 
Improvement, LAW & CONTElllP. PROBS., Winter 1997, at 185, 185-86 (hypothesizing, 
based upon empirical data, that iatrogenically injured claimants want to ensure that 
errors are not repeated and that mediation can produce quality improvements). 
121. Refer to text accompanying notes 78-81 supra (comparing the cooperative 
means used by a public health model \vith the tort liability system's tactics of 
coercion). 
122. See, e.g., Gostin et al., supra note 73, at 75 (describing the government's 
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The compensation of injured patients through the medical liability 
system might occur, but eliminating the threat of liability or 
imposing liability has never been high on the public health agenda. 
Focusing on the community's health and community resources for 
health improvement helps to diminish the search for an individual 
to "blame" for a particular disaster or tragedy. 
Given that new knowledge is not yet available, the public 
rhetoric of systems thinking must confront the reality that 
existing instruments of law (such as liability suits for 
compensation, disciplinary procedures, and even criminal 
prosecutions) are sometimes employed when there is in fact a 
well-publicized instance of error that has led to injury. 
Confronting the legal risks of liability for health care 
organizations and professionals as well as disciplinary actions 
and criminal prosecutions against professionals is necessary 
because the kind of research that needs to be done requires the 
cooperation of health care professionals. Achieving this 
cooperation will require lawyers to increase their understanding 
of the complexity and diversity of health care organizations. 
A Systems Thinking in Organizations and in Law 
With their various notions about the interrelationship of 
injury prevention and liability, tort reformers have proposed 
normative models of how the "system of law" and the health care 
system should relate. "Enterprise liability," initially applied to 
hospitals123 and later to health plans and managed care 
organizations, 124 is one model widely discussed in the legal 
literature that might be offered as law's response to systems 
thinking about injury prevention within health care 
organizations.125 These reforms are based upon certain 
assumptions as well as some empirical evidence about how the 
incentives of enterprise liability operate within health care 
organizations. 
use of education, the marketing of alternative behaviors, and legislative measures 
taken to discourage activities that are public health threats). 
123. See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 67, at 384-94 (chronicling the rise of 
hospital liability for medical injuries). 
124. See id. at 393 n.45 (noting that HMOs are subject to vicarious liability for 
the negligent acts of their employee-doctors). 
125. See id. at 401-04 (stating the reasons for the adoption of an enterprise 
medical liability model, which include protection against dramatic medical 
malpractice and insurance rate changes, an increase in the size of risk pools leading 
to more predictable claims for hospitals, and a greater guarantee to victims of actual 
payment on a judgment). 
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The systems thinking that Lucian Leape and others promote 
has been best described in the legal literature not by any tort 
theorist, but by a bankruptcy lawyer, Lynn LoPucki. As he noted 
in a recent publication, systems analysis is a "methodology 
developed in the fields of engineering, business information 
systems, and computer programming specifically to manage 
complexity."126 LoPucki has emphasized that the major 
contribution of systems analysis as applied to law is the "shift in 
perspective from law as a conceptual system to law as an element 
of concrete, empirically-verifiable 'law-related' systems."127 
It is tempting to simply adopt the LoPucki model of a 
systems approach to law, with its emphasis on empirically 
verifiable elements. But to do so would ignore the fact that a 
systems approach to error in health care is itself a search for 
data, or as I prefer to call it, "knowledge." The premise 
underlying the new emphasis on patient safety is that the extent 
of the patient error problem in medicine is unknown because the 
culture of medicine assumes that errors are simply a function of 
poor performance by individual professionals.126 In plain terms, 
there is no data on error because, heretofore, only injuries, 
mortality, and perhaps lawsuits were relevant from the 
perspective of gaining knowledge about poor professional 
performance. The kind of systems thinking that Leape and his 
colleagues call for comes from engineering as well as numerous 
other disciplines, such as "human factors" research and 
organizational development.129 It is the latter disciplines, which 
do not necessarily have the patina that LoPucki refers to as 
"scientific," that are of particular relevance to the patient safety 
debate.130 
126. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Systems Approach to Law, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 479, 
481 (1997). 
127. Id. at 482, 488-91 (endorsing the benefits of confining the study of law to 
concrete systems, or systems composed of "real people and/or other physical objects," 
which include objectivity and the ability to infer functioning of the system when 
direct investigation is not feasible). 
128. See Belkin, supra note 21, at 28 (describing medicine as continuing to focus 
on who made the error although other disciplines try to determine why an error 
occurred); Leape, Error in Medicine, supra note 13, at 1852 (describing the medical 
culture as manipulating blame and the punishment of individualB in order to 
discourage error). 
129. See, e.g., Lucian L. Leape, A Systems Analysis of Approaches to Medical 
Error, 3 J. EvAL. CLIN. PRACT. 213, 213 (1997); Billings & Reynard, supra note 107, 
at 960 (studying aircraft incident data to better understand the phenomenon of 
human error, which contributes to at least half of all aviation mishaps). 
130. LoPucki is probably a positivist. He concludes his article: 
The systems approach provides a way for legal scholars to get in touch with 
reality, to discover how law-related systems work through empiricism, and 
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For patient safety advocates, systems thinking requires an 
exploration of how individuals interact not only with technology, 
but also with other human beings. For instance, organizational 
theorists have developed the concept of ''high reliability 
organizations"131 in determining how organizations reduce risk. 
An oft-cited example is that of Navy aircraft carriers-
organizations that manage numerous takeoffs and landings with 
few accidents leading to injury, death, or loss of property. 132 The 
low accident rate is impressive when one considers the speed at 
which jet planes are moving when they touch the small surface of 
the deck, and that those most responsible for "hooking" the 
planes are young seamen.133 These organizational theorists 
emphasize the notions of "team work" and shared responsibility 
for "safety" on aircraft carriers, and among flight crews in 
general, that are antithetical to the hierarchical stereotype of the 
chain of command in military organizations. 134 Despite a rigid 
bureaucratic structure, the military in fact operates on a 
different set of rules when it comes to "safety," not only with 
regard to the pilots and crew working on the deck, but also to 
protecting the millions of dollars invested in each military 
aircraft and the aircraft carrier itself. 135 
Advocates for patient safety have offered solutions from the 
airline industry without noting how different health care is from 
the airline industry in terms of both organization and 
surrounding legal structure. Without demeaning the impressive 
ways in which many industries have reduced risk, I suggest that 
we need a way of thinking about individuals within systems 
before we undertake the empirical search for error data. 
It is important to outline, rather than to resolve, the 
contours of the debate about the meaning of systems thinking. 
First, systems thinking for the health care industry is greatly 
to discover how they can be improved through modeling. The method is 
analogous to the kind of systems analysis used to manage complexity in the 
creation of business information systems and other comple..x computer 
programs. 
LoPucki, supra note 126, at 521. 
131. See, e.g., Martha Grabowski & Karlene Roberts, Risk Mitigation in Large· 
Scale Systems: Lessons from High Reliability Organizations, 39 CAL. MGMT. REV. 
152, 152-53 (1997) (studying the characteristics of high-reliability organizations and 
finding that their characteristics include "simultaneous autonomy and 
interdependence, intended and unintended consequences, long [problem] incubation 
periods ... and risk mitigation"). 
132. See Karl E. Weick & Karlene H. Roberts, Collective Mind in Organizations: 
Heedful Interrelating on Flight Decks, 38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 357, 357-58 (1993). 
133. See id. at 357-63. 
134. See id. at 364. 
135. See id. at 371-72. 
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informed by the aviation narrative of safety, but ignores, at least 
in its public rhetoric, the gradual reorganization of health care's 
method of delivery and financial structures over the past twenty 
years.136 This reorganization-call it "managed care"-has 
occurred, by and large, without governmental mandate or direct 
intervention.137 Although there is a growing body of legal 
scholarship aimed at changing this market-driven 
reorganization/38 there is also a large body of literature about 
systems thinking that is applied to organizations. 133 For the 
patient safety debate, the question becomes: are there social and 
economic forces that might lead health care organizations to 
embrace "patient safety"? 
The systems thinking that deals with organizational 
development in businesses is in fact grounded in general social 
theory.140 One social fact about health care organizations is that a 
great many of the actors are licensed professionals-nurses, 
respiratory therapists, pharmacists, social workers, physicians, 
et cetera.141 Each of these professional groups has its own 
licensure board and method of disciplining professionals. 142 
Although physicians are assumed to be at the apex of the social 
system, systems thinking about the issues of patient safety would 
make us question whether physician behavior is the key variable 
in making the organization a "safer" environment, just as the 
Navy discards its traditional hierarchies on aircraft carriers.143 
136. See Liang, supra note 19, at 4. 
137. See id. at 2-3. 
138. See, e.g., id. at 92-93 (proposing a shift in incentive structures from n focus 
on cost limits to one on patient care). 
139. See, e.g., RoBERT L. FLOOD & NORMA R.A ROl\IM, DIVERSITY 
MANAGEMENT: TRIPLE LoOP LEARNING xi-xii (1996) (describing the focus of their 
study on diversity management, or the management of various models and 
methodologies, and "triple loop learning," a deeper and more reflexive learning 
process); PETER M. SENGE, THE FIFI'H DISCIPLINE: THE ART AND PRACTICE OF THE 
LEARNING ORGANIZATION 1-7 (1990) (introducing the concept of "learning 
organizations," which incorporate a systems thinking approach, to management and 
business). 
140. See FLOOD & ROMM, supra note 139, at 36-52 (stating that systems 
thinking, based upon metatheory, has incorporated societal theory into its goal of 
unifying science). 
14L See CURRAN ET AL., supra note 86, at 927-31 (discussing various aspects of 
medical professionals' licensure and their impact on the availability of providers, 
benefits to consumers, and the effectiveness of licensing board disciplinary actions). 
142. See id. at 930 (describing the history of disciplinary boards and recent 
changes that have effected improvements in the collection of data on disciplinary 
actions). 
143. See SENGE, supra note 139, at 27-54 (providing examples from a systems 
perspective in which problem solving focuses beyond individual mistakes to the 
underlying structures that shape events). 
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This wider view of the actors makes us aware of the social 
construction of knowledge within health care organizations-
following "doctors' orders"-that may in fact create risks to patient 
well being in some situations. When, for instance, a physician 
makes a mistake in the decimal point of the dosage of a drug, the 
failure of the nurse or pharmacist to question the dosage can lead 
to tragic consequences.144 We know that some entity or person in 
the health care system is legally liable after the fact for the injury 
or death, but from a social theory perspective, the patient is the 
client of the physician as well as the pharmacist, various nurses, 
and the hospital.145 The underlying premise of systems thinking, 
when applied to social organizations, is that "[ w ]hen placed in the 
same system, people, however different, tend to produce similar 
results. "146 The "system" in this sense is not simply the 
organizational structure, but the interrelationships of individuals, 
the technology employed in the organization, and the various 
organizational goals such as patient care, cost effectiveness, and 
being a "good employer."147 
The most important difference between the organizational 
structures of health care and aviation, as systems, is that the 
former is significantly more "diverse" than the latter in terms of 
goals. "Diverse" in this context means that there is more tension 
among the goals of various actors within the system of health 
care than in aviation.148 For instance, nurses, who are employees 
of the hospital, might define their role as "caring" for the patient, 
whereas surgeons, who are independent contractors, might 
define their role as "curing" or "ameliorating" the patient's 
disease. The hospital administrator must manage this type of 
diversity in establishing staffing levels consistent with the 
amount of expected reimbursement from private and 
governmental insurance programs.149 
144. Refer to Part IV.C.1 infra (discussing accidental deaths resulting from the 
misreading of a chemotherapy dose). 
145. See, e.g., Settlement Reached in Overdose Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 
1995, at A20 [hereinafter Settlement Reached] (noting that the error leading to a 
patient's chemotherapy overdose was overlooked by "[a]t least a dozen doctors, 
nurses, and pharmacists"). 
146. SENGE, supra note 139, at 42-43 (advocating a perspective that looks 
beyond individual mistakes to the system that shaped the erroneous actions). 
147. See Leape, Error in Medicine, supra note 13, at 1851 (labeling the nature of 
medical practice as "complex" and involving a "multitude of interventions that each 
patient receives" with an unsurprisingly high error rate); SENGE, supra note 139, at 
44 (explaining "systemic structure" as a term that is concerned with the 
interrelationships between people and among key variables that influence behavior 
overtime). 
148. See Leape, Error in Medicine, supra note 13, at 1855. 
149. Cf. FLOOD & ROMM, supra note 139, at 11 (defining "systemic" in terms of 
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Although the military officers overseeing the departure and 
landing of aircraft on an aircraft carrier have to manage 
diversity, the military has the advantage that everyone on the 
carrier is "in the Navy." As a result, everyone is a government 
employee ultimately subject to the coercion of government 
sanctions. The loss of an aircraft can, for instance, mean that the 
officer in charge of the carrier is reassigned to a desk job even if 
someone else lower in the chain of command was "responsible" or 
"to blame" for the loss of the aircraft. At the same time, the 
individual "responsible" is sanctioned, but in a public 
organization such as the military, it is arguably difficult to hide 
errors or accidents unless there is a "cover up." In effect, within 
public systems, in contrast to essentially private systems such as 
health care, the problem of diversity is more "manageable" 
because the conflicts among social goals are less intense. 1m 
Two other points about organizational systems thinking as 
applied to health care must be noted. First, some aspects of 
systems thinking are grounded in what one writer has called 
"cybemetics"-a belief that society is organized around scientific 
and technological knowledge.151 Such a belief, when applied to 
health care, would posit solutions in technocratic terms such as 
moving to computerized systems for writing and dispensing drug 
prescriptions within hospitals.lli2 Given that modem medicine is 
being able to manage this type of diversity). For an example of a court trying to sort 
out the systems issues involved when a patient's insurance expires, see Muse u. 
Charter Hospital, Inc., 452 S.E.2d 589, 596 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995), aff'd per curiam, 
464 S.E.2d 44 (1996) (stating that the hospital could be held liable for a physician's 
discharge of a patient who later committed suicide because its policy of discharging 
patients when their insurance expired interfered with the physician's professional 
judgment). 
150. The veterans' health system is government owned, but the professionals in 
the system view themselves primarily as autonomous and quite often, at the 
hospital level, they mirror those actors in a private system. From a legal perspective, 
the rules of liability are different from those in the private sector. All health care 
personnel working for the Department of Veteran's Affairs are immune from suits 
regarding alleged malpractice committed in the exercise of their duties to the VA 
under the Tort Claims Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1) (1994); 38 C.F.R § 14.605(a) 
(1998). A patient with such a claim would have no recourse except to sue the United 
States. See 39 C.F.R § 14.605(b). The Department of Justice may defend VA 
employees in suits brought against them for such claims, see id. § 14.514(b), and the 
VA may indemnify those employees for judgments against them, see id. § 14.514(c). 
For an example of how one VA hospital has handled medical mistakes, see S.S. 
Karman & G. Hamm, Risk Management: Extreme Honesty MaJ..es the Best Policy, 
131 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 963, 963-67 (1999). 
15L See FLOOD & RoMM:, supra note 139, at 37. 
152. See David W. Bates et al., Effect of Computerized Physician Order Entry 
and a Team Intervention on Prevention of Serious Medication Errors, 280 JAMA 
1311, 1315 (1998) (commenting that a physician computer order system prevented 
"more than half of the serious medical errors" when used at a large tertiary care 
hospital). 
1642 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [36:1609 
closely aligned with science, one should expect that the systems 
approach to health care issues will place a heavy emphasis upon 
"data" as objective depictions ofthe real world.153 
Second, this analytical/empirical view of systems thinking as 
applied to social organizations has a close relationship to the 
recent debates over the dominance of positivism in the social 
sciences.154 This debate has had its influence on legal theorists, as 
challengers to the dominance of legal positivism have offered 
other methods of interpreting law.155 Given this wide-ranging 
debate, a variety of approaches to law is possible. At the same 
time, there are a variety of ways in which law interacts with the 
health care system. Finding the appropriate point of leverage in 
the legal structure requires an openness to the possibility that 
law-at least the system of imposing liability after a medical 
injury-may in fact have little effect upon safety in the health 
care system. 
B. The Blurry Line Between Public Health and Medical Liability 
To illustrate how this paradigm shift affects our thinking, 
consider two cases from the borderline among public health, 
medical liability, and the delivery of health care services. First is 
the problem of HIV-infected blood in the early days of the AIDS 
epidemic. In Doe v. American National Red Cross/56 the court 
held that the supplier of blood products had provided a 
professional service and could be found liable to a person 
transfused with blood that had not been screened for the HIV 
virus in 1983.157 The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) did 
not approve the antibody test for blood until March 1985.158 
153. See generally LARRY I. PALMER, ENDINGS AND BEGINNINGS: LAW, 
MEDICINE AND SOCIETY IN AsSISTED LIFE AND DEATH (forthcoming). 
154. See FLOOD & ROl\:IM, supra note 139, at 22-23 (outlining the debate between 
those societal scientists who espouse a "positivist, value-free" methodology taken 
from the natural sciences and those who believe that the societal sciences ought to 
develop their own methodology that would acknowledge "the influences of values on 
theoretical interpretation"). 
155. For an interesting critique of the dominance of "scientism" in legal 
scholarship, see MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE: THE LITERARY 
IMAGINATION AND PuBLIC LIFE 83-86 (1995) (rejecting fixed, scientific approaches to 
lawmaking and praising the common law process for its congruence with an 
Aristotelian norm of practical reasoning that accommodates changes in 
circumstances and values over time). 
156. 848 F. Supp. 1228 (S.D. W. Va. 1994). 
157. See id. at 1229, 1234-35. 
158. See Robert Pear, AIDS Blood Test to Be Available in 2 to 6 Weeks, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 3, 1985, at 23. 
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Shortly thereafter, the entire industry started to use the test to 
screen the blood supply.159 
Once there was an understanding of how HIV was 
transmitted, it seemed logical that screening the blood supply 
would be a source of prevention. From a patient safety 
perspective, the use of blood screening devices is crucial to 
prevent the spread of the HIV virus through medical treatment. 
In hindsight, most of this makes sense, but it is apparent that 
the threat of liability for negligence also played a role in the 
speed with which the industry adopted screening for HIV. In Doe, 
the Red Cross argued unsuccessfully that the standard of due 
care should be whether it had followed industry practices in 
screening blood prior to the FDA's 1985 edict.1v) At the time of the 
transfusion, blood banks were not screening blood for the HIV 
virus. The court rejected this analysis and allowed the jury to 
decide, under a common law standard of negligence, if the 
industry's practice (and thus that of the Red Cross) was 
"reasonable."161 By rejecting the Red Cross's request for summary 
judgment, the court allowed the plaintiffs to proceed to trial.1&2 
It is tempting to read Doe as representing the need for public 
health perspectives to prevent the spread of infectious diseases 
and ignore the larger systemic issues of patient safety. How does 
a society assure itself that the products and devices used in 
health care delivery minimize the risk of further injury to 
patients? Although these issues were eventually resolved by FDA 
regulation, 163 one must remember that FDA regulation is, like 
any other institutional response, of limited effectiveness. FDA 
approval of a device does not and should not eliminate the 
possibility of "product liability" for the manufacturer of a heart 
159. See id. (describing FDA plans to distribute the test to 2300 blood banks, 
plasma centers, and laboratories). 
160. See American Nat'l Red Cross, 848 F. Supp. at 1231, 1235. 
16L See id. at 1233 (stating that the defendant would face liability if "its 
practices fell below the standards promulgated and practiced by the blood-banking 
industry, or that the industry standards were themselves unacceptably deficient 
given the [available] reliable data and knowledge"). Cases of this type were often 
settled because the facts were usually quite egregious. For instance, in Doe, the Red 
Cross had known for several years prior to the filing of the lawsuit that the blood 
transfused into the young child in 1983 was contaminated because the donor had 
died of AIDS. See id. at 1230. By 1990, when the child was diagnosed with mv, the 
hospital's transfusion service had destroyed the records indicating who had received 
the contaminated blood that the Red Cross had shipped. See id. 
162. See id. at 1235-36. 
163. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475-77 U996) (discussing 
the history and development from the early part of this century of the FDA's 
mandate to approve drugs and, later, medical devices). 
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pacemaker, for example.164 What is important to learn from Doe is 
that there is interplay among the growth of knowledge (recall 
that the test for routine screening of blood for the HIV virus had 
not yet been developed when the Doe patient was infected), the 
possibility of liability for failing to operate in accordance with 
that knowledge, and the development of regulatory schemes. 
The second example of the interplay among potential 
medical liability, public health, and health care delivery is 
dramatically illustrated by Bradshaw v. Daniel.165 In Bradshaw, 
the court held that a physician may be held liable for failing to 
warn a wife of her risk of having Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever 
after her husband died from the disease.166 The physician treated 
the husband for Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever, but allegedly 
never communicated to the wife the findings of the autopsy that 
her husband's death, which occurred four days after admission to 
the hospital's emergency room, was caused by the disease.167 The 
court's refusal to grant the defendant-physician summary 
judgmene68 is significant for two reasons. First, there was no 
physician-patient relationship between the wife and her 
husband's treating physician.169 In point of fact, a week after her 
husband's death, she was admitted and treated for Rocky 
Mountain Spotted Fever at a different hospital by a different 
physician. 170 She died shortly thereafter .171 There was in fact a 
limited time window to communicate to anyone the exact cause of 
the husband's death because the Centers for Disease Control did 
not confirm the physician's initial diagnosis of Rocky Mountain 
Spotted Fever until nearly two months after the man's death.172 
Second, under most circumstances, a physician is potentially 
liable under several theories if he or she wrongfully discloses the 
medical records of a patient.173 
164. See id. at 474, 507 (holding that FDA approval of a pacemaker did not pre-
empt the plaintiff's common-law claims). 
165. 854 S.W.2d 865 (Tenn. 1993). 
166. See id. at 872-73. 
167. See id. at 866-67. 
168. See id. at 873. 
169. See id. at 867. 
170. See id. 
17L See id. 
172. See id. (relating, however, that an autopsy was initially performed by the 
hospital shortly after his death). 
173. See, e.g., Warner v. Lerner, 705 A2d 1169, 1173 (Md. 1998) (fmding a 
physician liable to a patient for the disclosure of his medical records without the 
patient's or hospital's permission). Cf. Estate of Berthiaume v. Pratt, 365 A2d 792 
(Me. 1976) (holding a physician liable for invasion of privacy for taking photographs 
of a patient without permission). 
1999]PATIENT SAFETY, RISK REDUCTION, & THE LAW 1645 
The court's finding of an affirmative duty to warn 
identifiable third parties of the risk of Rocky Mountain Spotted 
Fever is justified, however, if one considers the case as one about 
the distribution of professional knowledge. Rocky Mountain 
Spotted Fever is not contagious, 174 but the plaintiff's experts 
testified that the ticks that cause the disease "cluster."176 As a 
result, anyone in close proximity to a person infected with the 
disease is likely to have been exposed to the ticks at the same 
time as the infected person.176 As between a layperson and a 
physician with access to knowledge about the etiology of the 
disease in a public health sense, the court held that physicians 
have a legal duty to warn persons they can identify as potentially 
exposed.177 This goes beyond the medical model of attempting to 
treat the disease with the appropriate drugs and imposes a duty 
to know about the public health consequences of the causative 
agents-the bite from the ticks. Put in plain terms, every camper 
should know of the risk of Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever, but 
the court's ruling implies that a reasonable physician has a duty 
to know about the phenomenon of clustering and the risks t{) 
others closely associated with the patient who sought treatment. 
In effect, the court ruled that the delivery of health care could not 
be separated from the larger context of scientific knowledge 
about the origins and spread of disease, including the public 
health implications of professional practice. 
C. "Blaming" Nurses 
Nurses, rather than physicians, have been subject to 
discipline or criminal prosecution for medical errors in some 
recent, highly publicized cases. A focus on nurses will help to 
delineate the systemic issues because nurses are most often 
"employees" of health care organizations.178 Many physicians and 
surgeons are, conversely, "independent contractors" working 
within health care organizations, be they hospitals or networks of 
managed care organizations.179 Both incidents discussed in this 
section involve the (mis)administration of drugs, the most 
common source of medical error.180 
174. See Bradshaw, 854 S.W.2d at 869. 
175. See id. at 867,872. 
176. See id. 
177. See id. at 872-73 (emphasizing a duty to warn "identifiable third persons in 
the patient's immediate family against foreseeable risks emanating from a patient's 
illness"). 
178. See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 67, at 387. 
179. See id. 
180. Less well documented is the effect of "culture" on work in health care 
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1. The Wrong Dosage of Chemotherapy. In 1994, Betsy 
Lehman, a 39-year-old health care columnist for the Boston 
Globe, and Maureen Bateman, a 53-year-old school teacher, were 
patients at the Dana-Farber Cancer Institute in Boston.191 Both 
women had breast cancer.182 An oncology resident ordered that 
both women be given the same form of chemotherapy that was 
approved for use at Dana-Farber under a special research grant 
from the National Institutes of Health.183 The protocol for this 
treatment required that each patient receive the intravenous 
drip over a four-day period.184 Instead, the entire amount of the 
drug was given to each woman during each twenty-four hour 
period for four days. 185 Betsy Lehman died shortly after the 
treatment overdose.186 Maureen Bateman suffered cardiac 
damage and died three years later.187 Several months after Betsy 
Lehman's death in March 1995, a clerk at Dana-Farber 
discovered that Ms. Lehman had been given an overdose.188 
Defining the "error" that led to injury and death during the 
course of an experimental treatment depends upon the 
perspective taken. From a systems thinking perspective, the 
injuries and deaths were caused by the process with which drug 
organizations. See, e.g., David M. Gaba, M.D., Physician Work Hours: The "Sore 
Thumb" of Organizational Safety in Tertiary Health Care, Presented at the 
Enhancing Patient Safety and Reducing Errors in Health Care Conference, Nov. 8-
10, 1998, at 302 (proceedings on file \vith the author and the Houston Law Review). 
18L See Lawrence K Altman, 2 Chemotherapy Overdoses Lead to Review of 
Nurses, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1999, at A14. 
182. See id. 
183. See Richard A. Knox, Dana-Farber Tests Signaled an Overdose, Records 
Show, BOSTON GLOBE, May 2, 1995, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Bglobe 
File. 
184. See Richard A. Knox & Daniel Golden, Drug Overdose Was Questioned: 
Dana-Farber Pharmacist Sent Order Back to Doctor in Breast Cancer Case, BOSTON 
GLOBE, June 19, 1995, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Bglobe File. 
185. See Richard A. Knox, Doctor's Orders Killed Cancer Patient; Dana-Farber 
Admits Drug Overdose Caused Death of Globe Columnist, Damage to Second 
Woman, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 23, 1995, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, 
Bglobe File. 
186. See Altman, supra note 181, at A14. 
187. See id. 
188. See Robin Romano, Fatal Error Becomes Catalyst for Reform, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Mar. 15, 1999, at All. The chemotherapy overdose at Dana-Farber has 
become a "case study" at the Harvard Business School. See Richard Bohmer & Ann 
Winslow, The Dana-Farber Cancer Institute, Harv. Bus. Sch. Case #9-699-025 
(1999) (relating the history of Dana-Farber, its development and organization, and 
the overdose and death of Betsy Lehman). The tutorial supplement to the case study 
introduces "human factors" in health care. See Richard Bohmer, Complexity and 
Error in Medicine, Harv. Bus. Sch. Case #9-699-024, at 4-8 (1998) (analyzing various 
types of human error as they stem from either an "automatic" or "problem-solving" 
mode of cognition). Human factors is one of the disciplines used by aviation experts 
to enhance safety. 
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prescriptions are written, filled, and delivered to patients.183 Most 
obvious in these cases was the fact that the handwritten 
prescription for the drug used as chemotherapy for the two 
patients' form of breast cancer was not clearly Iegible.1w Another 
possible source of the error is the ethos that nurses (and 
pharmacists) do not question doctors' orders, especially on an 
experimental treatment protocol that has no "routine 
procedure. "191 
From a health care delivery perspective, Dana-Farber's 
small hospital for inpatients did not have a cardiologist on the 
scene that might have provided expert care when the two 
patients suffered cardiac problems. A further organizational 
issue was the fact that Dana-Farber was historically led by 
biomedical researchers rather than health care professionals 
emphasizing patient care.192 Finally, from the perspective of 
medical liability, Dana-Farber was liable for both the injuries 
and the deaths even if the physician who wrote the unclear order 
might also be individually liable.193 
189. See Leape et al., The Nature of Aduerse Euents, supra note 6, at 383-84 
(noting the role of the "medical-industrial system" in supplying drugs and 
equipment); cf. Bohmer, supra note 188, at 7-8, 13-14 (revealing that adverse drug 
events resulted from systems failures). 
190. See Bohmer & Winslow, supra note 188, at 7. The physician who wrote the 
prescription admitted in a consent proceeding with the Massachusetts physician 
licensing board that he had been guilty of malpractice. See Bruce Mohl, Doctor 
Penalized for Error in Dosage, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 10, 1998, at B3, auailable in 
LEXIS, News Library, Bglobe File (discussing James M. Foran's consent agreement 
with the Board of Registration and the Board's reasoning in asserting only mild 
disciplinary action against him). The Board suspended his license for three years. 
See id. (noting, however, that the license suspension was retroactive to a date three 
years earlier, meaning Foran could immediately reapply for his license). At the time 
the sanction was announced, he left the country for a research position at a London, 
England hospital. See id. 
191. Refer to notes 143-45 supra and accompanying teA-t. The nurse's ethical and 
clinical dilemma in "innovative" treatment is powerfully portrayed in a fictionalized 
account of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study in David Feldshuh's play focusing on an 
African-American public health nurse. See generally MISS EVERS' BOYS (David 
Feldshuh 1995). The play was later developed into a prizewinning made-for-
television movie by Home Box Office and was a force in President Clinton's apology 
to survivors for the United States Public Health-sponsored study. See Larry I. 
Palmer, Paying for Suffering: The Problem of Human Experimentation, 56 MD. L. 
REv. 604, 604-05 (1997). 
192. See Bohmer & Winslow, supra note 188, at 3 (citing many of Dana-Farber's 
medical breakthroughs to demonstrate that research has always been at the core of 
Dana-Farber's mission); Richard A Knox, Dana-Farber Puts Focus on Mistakes in 
Ouerdoses, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 31, 1995, at 1, auailable in LEXIS, News Library, 
Bglobe File (commenting that Dana-Farber's investigators found that the institute 
lacked patient-care expertise). 
193. See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 67, at 387-88 (relating that hospitals 
are often found liable for their independent contractor physicians under a theory of 
"apparent authority"). 
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Dana-Farber quickly offered settlements in both cases.194 
Relying upon the growing knowledge about systems errors, 
Dana-Farber made changes in the way drugs were dispensed by 
adopting the computer-order-entry system advocated by Lucian 
Leape and his colleagues.195 The organization went even further 
and installed a new chief executive with patient care 
experience.196 The organization also transferred the operation of 
its hospital to a Partners Hospital, a recent merger of several 
hospitals affiliated with the Harvard Medical School.197 In effect, 
Dana-Farber recognized that it did not have the infrastructure to 
run a "safe" inpatient hospital service and chose to focus on 
outpatient care and research.198 Of course, the JCAHO 
investigated this highly publicized event, as did the 
Massachusetts Department of Health.199 Both agencies praised 
the corrective efforts that Dana-Farber took to prevent future 
occurrences. 200 
However, nearly five years after the event, the 
Massachusetts Board of Registration in Nursing charged 
eighteen nurses with failing to meet the standards of nursing 
practice.201 These charges of unprofessional conduct were based 
upon the theory that one of the nurses hung the infusion bags for 
the drugs and connected them to the patients, and the other 
nurses, on subsequent shifts during the twenty-four hour period, 
monitored the flow of the drugs. 202 The Board argued that the 
nurses should have "verified" the dosage.203 The executive director 
194. See Settlement Reached, supra note 145, at A20. In newspaper reports of 
the settlement with Betsy Lehman's husband, a Dana-Farber employee, the 
husband indicated that a portion of the settlement was donated to Dana-Farber for 
research on finding a cure for cancer. See, e.g., id. The settlement with the other 
patient, Maureen Bates, is described in a story of how she overcame the effects of the 
overdose. See Richard A Knox, Survivor's Spirit Beats a Chemotherapy Error, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 17, 1995, at 1, auailable in LEXIS, News Library, Bglobe File. 
195. See Robin Romano, supra note 188, at All. Refer to note 152 supra and 
accompanying text (describing the advantages of a computerized drug dispensing 
system). 
196. See Richard Knox, Top Dana-Farber Doctor Steps Down, BOSTON GLOBE, 
May 11, 1995, at 1, auailable in LEXIS, News Library, Bglobe File. 
197. See Richard A Knox, Three Hospitals Form Cancer Partnership; Dana· 
Farber, Brigham, MGH Will Consolidate Treatment, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 17, 1996, 
at 1, auailable in LEXIS, News Library, Bglobe File. 
198. See id. 
199. See Lucian L. Leape, Faulty Systems, Not Faulty People, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Jan. 12, 1999, at A15, auailable in LEXIS, News Library, Bglobe File [hereinafter 
Leape, Faulty Systems]. 
200. See id. 
20L See Altman, supra note 181, at A14. 
202. Seeid. 
203. See id. 
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of the Board made it clear that the "system" she thought 
appropriate was an individual professional system of "double 
checking. "204 Of the Dana-Farber practice, she said: "'Apparently 
the system in place at the time did not require the nurses t<> 
double check.'"205 
The nurse-as-a-check on physician prescription error seeks 
to elevate the status of nurses as the ultimate caretakers of 
patients and protectors of patient safety. The statute granting 
the Board of Registration authority to investigate complaints 
against nurses, however, gives the Board the discretion to 
develop its own standards of professionalism based upon 
individual conduct.206 The real issue for the patient safety debate 
is whether the Board would use its discretion to sanction a nurse 
who failed to participate in the new computerized medication 
system at Dana-Farber in instances in which no patient was 
injured or killed. It is highly probable that disciplinary boards 
are not yet ready to embrace "systems changes" as part of 
individual professional responsibility. Therefore, those engaged 
in systems changes after a tragic accident must take on the 
burden of protecting individual professionals.Z(j7 This is what 
Dana-Farber has in fact done by publicly defending the nurses.m 
Yet two of the nurses quickly settled with the Board and agreed 
to a year's probation and retraining.209 
2. Giving the Right Drug in the Wrong Fashion. Miguel 
Angel Sanchez died one day after he was born at a Colorado 
hospital in October 1996.210 Three nurses who gave him a large 
dosage of an oil-based penicillin intravenously rather than 
intramuscularly were charged with criminally negligent 
homicide.211 The nurses not only gave the baby the drug in an 
improper fashion, they gave him more than ten times the amount 
204. See Leslie Miller, Nurses Face Sanctions for Following Orders that Led to 
Overdoses, Hous. CHRON., Jan. 6, 1999, at 9A (squarely blaming the tragedy on the 
nurses' failure to question the dose). 
205. Id. 
206. See MAss. GEN. LAws .ANN. ch.112, §§ 74,80 (West 1996). 
207. Cf. Leape, Faulty Systems, supra note 199, at Al5 (urging that the Board of 
Registration in Nursing's bringing the 18 nurses involved in the Dana-Farber 
overdose to disciplinary hearings was inappropriate). 
208. See Altman, supra note 181, at Al4 (quoting Dana-Farber's president as 
saying that the nurses "did their job" as they should have). 
209. See Leslie Miller, supra note 204, at 9A (commenting that the other 16 
nurses still faced disciplinary charges). 
210. See Ann Schrader & Marilyn Robinson, Baby's Nurses Face Homicide 
Charges, DENVER POST, Apr. 29, 1997, at A-01, available in 1997 WL 6071695 
[hereinafter Schrader & Robinson, Baby's Nurses]. 
21L Seeid. 
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of the penicillin that the doctor had intended and in fact 
ordered.212 By calling a noted systems thinker on medication 
errors as an expert witness, the defense presented enough 
evidence about how the initial error made by the pharmacists in 
misreading the prescription led to the tragic death to raise a 
reasonable doubt about whether the nurses operated in a manner 
that deviated "grossly from the standard of care. "213 The two 
nurses who went to trial were acquitted, and the third nurse 
entered a plea of nolo contendre and did not receive a jail term or 
fine.zt4 
Not surprisingly, the grand jury indictment of the three 
nurses created a great deal of alarm among health care 
professionals involved in the patient safety movement.21u Little 
attention has been given to determining whether there are 
means of providing some protection for nurses from criminal 
prosecution, but not immunity, within existing doctrines 
surrounding medicine. Once again, the fear of litigation (meaning 
malpractice) has obscured the need for careful analysis of the 
distinction between the way civil and criminal law operates, 
particularly how criminal law ought to operate vis-a-vis health 
care professionals. Even after looking at the facts in a light most 
212. See id.; see also Michael R. Cohen, RPH. MS, FASHP, Error, Negligence, 
Crime: The Denver Nurses Trial, presented at the Enhancing Patient Safety and 
Reducing Errors in Health Care Conference 71 (Nov. 8-10, 1998) [hereinafter Cohen, 
Error, Negligence, Crime] (proceedings on file with the author and the Houston Law 
Review). 
213. See id. "A person acts with criminal negligence when, through a gross 
deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise, he fails 
to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that a result will occur or that a 
circumstance exists." COLO. REV. STAT.§ 18-1-501(3) (1999). "Any person who causes 
the death of another person by conduct amounting to criminal negligence commits 
criminally negligent homicide which is a class 5 felony." Id. § 18-3-105. 
214. See Cohen, Error, Negligence, Crime, supra note 212, at 71. The nolo 
contendre plea is in substance a plea of guilty. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., 
CRIMINAL LAW: THEORY AND PROCESS 6 (197 4). A great deal of the criminal process 
is through nonadjudicative processes that often mask important questions of law, 
ethics, and public policy. See Larry I. Palmer, Life, Death and Public Policy, 81 
CORNELL L. REV. 161, 161 (1995) (reviewing NEIL K KOMESAR, ALTERNATIVES: 
CHOOSING IN LAW, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994) and presenting a 
provocative representation of the problems of analyzing issues of law and medicine 
in the context of a nolo contendre plea by a health care professional). Guilty pleas 
and acquittals present lawyers with a particular problem of analysis because our 
common law training is developed from adjudicated cases, particularly appellate 
cases. See id. 
215. William Sage of Columbia Law School stated that the accountability issues 
involved in the Denver Nurses Trial encouraged the conference participants to 
consider safety in their own systems. See Plenary Session: Responses from Multiple 
Perspectives, Presented at the Enhancing Patient Safety and Reducing Errors in 
Health Care Conference 115 (Nov. 8-18, 1998) (Nancy W. Dickey, moderator) 
(proceedings on file with the author and the Houston Law Review). 
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favorable to the District Attorney who brought the charges, there 
are grounds to argue that the indictments should have been 
dismissed. 
The Sanchez baby was "healthy."216 The problem was that 
the mother's doctor was concerned about the effects of her history 
of syphilis on the newborn.217 Although the mother tested positive 
for syphilis, she indicated that she had been treated for syphilis 
in Los Angeles.218 Unwilling to take the mother's word, someone 
in the hospital checked with the Los Angeles Department of 
Health about the mother's treatment.219 The Health Department 
was unable to confirm the mother's treatment.= 
It is, however, clear that the laboratory test conducted on 
the date of the baby's death indicated the baby did not have 
congenital syphilis.221 Without waiting for the results of these 
tests, a neonatologist, who had taken over the care of the baby 
from the family practitioner, wrote the prescription for a single 
dosage of the penicillin.222 In hindsight, it is obvious that the 
prescription was written on the "hunch" that the thirty-two-year-
old mother of then four children had untreated syphilis. 
It is also clear that the form of penicillin prescribed, 
"Benzathine penicillin G," was not a standard form of penicillin 
because it was described as a "non-formulary drug."223 The 
pharmacist filling the prescription was unfamiliar with the drug 
and with the treatment for congenital syphilis and consulted 
216. See Schrader & Robinson, Baby's Nurses, supra note 210, at A-01. 
217. See Keith Coffman, Lawyer: Nurse Was Not at Fault; Woman on Trial in 
Baby's Death, DENVER POST, Jan. 29, 1998, at B-03, auailable in LEXIS, News 
Library, Dpost File (noting that the mother had been infected with syphilis 15 years 
before). 
218. See Error, Negligence, Crime-The Denver Nurses Trial; Part One: The 
Anatomy of an Event, Presented at the Enhancing Patient Safety and Reducing 
Errors in Health Care Conference 68 (Nov. 8-18, 1998) (Philip Schneider, moderatorJ 
[hereinafter Schneider, Anatomy of an Euent] (proceedings on file with the author 
and the Houston Law Reuiew ). 
219. See id. 
220. See id. at 67. There may have been some language barriers because it is 
apparent from newspaper reports, but not the hospital's own description of the case, 
that the father spoke only Spanish. See, e.g., :Michael Romano, Day·Old Boy Dies 
After Injection; Hospital Acknowledges Error, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Oct. 24, 
1996, at lA, auailable in 1996 WL 12352690. 
221. See Schneider, Anatomy of an Euent, supra note 218, at 68 !listing {ice 
diagnostic tests performed on the infant, all of which were negative for syphyllis). 
222. See id. 
223. See Error, Negligence, Crime-The Denver Nurses Trial; Part Two: Theory 
and Remedy, Presented at the Enhancing Patient Safety and Reducing Errors in 
Health Care Conference 71 (Nov. 8-18, 1998) (John W. Senders, moderator) 
(proceedings on file with the author and the Houston Law Reuiew ). 
1652 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [36:1609 
several texts to determine the dosage.224 In doing so, the 
pharmacist misread the dosages described in both texts and 
prepared a ten-fold increased dosage.225 She placed the dosages in 
two syringes and labeled the plastic bag containing the syringes 
to indicate that the drug was to be given intramuscularly.226 
The nurses assumed that each syringe could be used in an 
intramuscular injection for only a limited amount of the 
mistakenly written dosage.227 They believed that giving the 
amount in hand intramuscularly would require five injections, 
and consulted a text in the neonatal nursery to determine if the 
drug could be given intravenously, allegedly to prevent the pain 
of giving multiple intramuscular injections to the infant.228 
Unfortunately, the text they consulted did not mention 
Benzathine penicillin G, but did mention that another form of 
penicillin could be given intravenously for the treatment of 
congenital syphilis.229 In giving the drug intravenously, the 
nurses violated both the doctor's and the pharmacist's orders.230 
Bearing in mind that the baby in fact did not have 
congenital syphilis as well as the other demographics of the case, 
one can imagine how an elected district attorney might easily see 
this as a case of gross carelessness in overmedication. On the 
other hand, in our adversary system, a lawyer for the nurses 
should have tried to test the legitimacy of the prosecutor's 
instincts by attempting to dismiss the indictment. Dismissing an 
indictment is very difficult in American criminal jurisprudence 
because prosecutors are given such wide discretion in charging 
crimes. There is, however, some precedent in the medical area 
developed for physicians that should be used for nurses. 
3. The "End-of-Life" (Mis)Diagnosis. In Barber v. Superior 
Court of Los Angeles,231 two doctors, who were charged with 
murder for allegedly "pulling the plug'' too quickly on a patient in 
a persistent vegetative state, filed a writ of prohibition. 232 There 
224. See id. 
225. See Schrader & Robinson, Baby's Nurses, supra note 210, at A-01. 
226. See id. 
227. See Schneider, Anatomy of an Event, supra note 218, at 68-69. 
228. See Ann Schrader & Marilyn Robinson, Healthy Baby's Tragic Death at 
Hospital Being Probed, DENVER POST, Oct. 25, 1996, at B-07, available in 1996 WL 
12634805. 
229. See Schneider, Anatomy of an Event, supra note 218, at 69. 
230. See Schrader & Robinson, Baby's Nurses, supra note 210, at A-01 (revealing 
that the pharmacist affixed a label to the prescription order which stated that it was 
to be injected intramuscularly). 
231. 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). 
232. See id. at 486. 
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was some doubt as to whether the diagnosis of a persistent 
vegetative state could have been made as quickly as the 
physicians did prior to seeking permission from the patient's 
family to terminate all life support.233 As a matter of fact, the 
evidence at the preliminary hearing indicated that the family 
members thought the patient was "brain dead" when they were 
asked to sign a consent and a release of liability.zu There is a 
legal distinction between being "brain dead"-which in nearly 
every state constitutes a definition of death-and being in a 
"persistent vegetative state" that may allow, but not require, the 
removal of all life support including nutrition and fluids. 
Nonetheless, the California court dismissed the indictment on a 
broad jurisprudential ground about how the conduct of health 
care professionals should be analyzed in the criminal law.= 
The court ruled that the "act" of removing life support must 
be viewed in the context of the "physician's duty" to a patient.z:m 
Thus, to support a criminal charge at the indictment stage, the 
prosecution must prove to a court (not a jury) that a physician 
had a duty to continue treatment.237 In effect, the court's duty 
analysis ironically views the physician's acts for the purposes of 
criminal law as if they were "omissions"-a failure to do 
something to prevent harm to the dead person.239 The rationale 
for such a ruling is that the role of physician carries with it risks 
to human life and health that must be accounted for before 
criminal liability is considered.239 This explains why so few 
prosecutions are in fact brought regarding "end-of-life care," why 
grand juries often refuse to indict, and why juries in fact are 
reluctant to convict physicians charged with crimes for their end-
of-life actions.240 A prosecutor must overcome all the barriers in 
our common law system against convicting individuals for 
"omissions." 
233. See id. at 486, 491. 
234. See PALMER, LAW, MEDICINE, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 83, at 100 
(recounting evidence from the magistrate's findings). 
235. See Barber, 195 Cal Rptr. at 493 (concluding that there was no legal duty 
to continue medical treatment and, therefore, no reason for the court to ascertain 
whether the physicians' conduct was the proximate cause of death). 
236. See id. at 490 (analyzing the physicians' conduct as an "omission rather 
than [an] affirmative action"). 
237. See id. 
238. See Glanville Williams, EuthalUlSia, 41 :MED. LEGAL J. 14, 21 (1973). 
239. See Barber, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 488-89 (recognizing that this intersection of 
advanced medical technology and limited legislative guidance requires the 
evaluation of several social and philosophical issues). 
240. See PALMER, ENDINGS AND BEGINNINGS, supra note 153, at 8-9, 13-14 
(discussing the technical arguments made before juries by Jack Kevorkian's lawyers 
in his early trials for assisted suicide). 
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4. Summary. The application of this principle to the nurses 
in the Sanchez case requires the resolution of two issues. First, 
whether the duty analysis announced in the California murder 
case discussed above should apply to criminally negligent 
homicide, the crime with which the nurses were charged.241 
Murder and criminally negligent homicide or manslaughter 
represent two distinct theories about how human death is caused 
and concomitant widely different ranges of punishments.242 
Without attempting to resolve an issue that criminal law 
scholars have debated for years, it can be stated by asking 
whether the court in Barber would have dismissed the 
indictment if the prosecution had charged the physicians with 
criminally negligent homicide, rather than murder, under the 
California statutes. 243 
The second issue is whether nurses are entitled to the 
benefits of Barber. The argument against application of the 
Barber duty analysis to nurses is the notion that nurses are 
simply to follow doctors' (and pharmacists') orders and therefore 
should not and do not engage directly in the risky life and death 
actions of physicians. However, the argument for applying this 
barrier from criminal prosecution to nurses stems, perhaps 
ironically, from systems thinking about health care. Had the 
nurses questioned the pharmacists, and even the neonatologist, 
they might have prevented an "error." Had they gone further and 
asked for a confirmation of the supposed underlying diagnosis of 
congenital syphilis, they might have completely reversed the 
course of the "treatment" plan. 
But the point of raising the theory to dismiss the indictment 
is not to prove that it would work, but to demonstrate the need 
for an understanding of the complexity of the legal system as 
health care organizations embark on efforts to reduce errors in 
health care. As the new scientific discipline of patient safety 
emerges, individuals will be subject to professional disciplinary 
proceedings and criminal charges.244 In practical terms, until the 
new knowledge is created, health care organizations concerned 
241. See Schneider, Anatomy of an Euent, supra note 218, at 69·70. 
242. See MODEL PENAL CODE§§ 210.2, 210.4, available in WESTLAW (current 
through the May 1998 meeting of the American Law Institute) (suggesting that 
criminally negligent homicide is a third degree felony and murder is a ftrst degree 
felony). 
243. See PALMER, LAW, MEDICINE, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 83, at 105. 
244. See Leape, Faulty Systems, supra note 199, at 1 (condemning the 
disciplinary sanctions against the Dana-Farber nurses). Refer to note 110 supra and 
accompanying text (relating the criminal charges that air industry personnel faced 
after a crash). 
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with systemic approaches to safety must understand and account 
for the legal risks of proceeding. 
D. The Risks of Research on Patient Safety 
At present, the patient safety movement is a national 
movement, but the criminal and civil liability systems remain 
state based. The key actors in the movement, namely scholars, 
the American Medical Association CAMA), national 
pharmaceutical associations, and federal regulatory agencies 
such as the FDA, seek national solutions.24fi In addition, some of 
these leaders, such as the National Patient Safety Foundation at 
the AMA, have spurred the development of state initiatives.:w> 
There are legal risks both to individuals and organizations in 
attempting to create new knowledge about patient safety. The 
issue is not how to eliminate those risks, but how to minimize the 
legal risks while focusing on the overall goal of reducing physical 
risks to patients. More generally, there is legal instability 
because of the social, economic, and demographic changes 
affecting health care delivery in this country. To bring those 
forces into focus, we must consider a state in which the forces of 
managed care and liability reform over the past quarter of 
century are evident. 
California, a state that adopted some of the 1970s reforms of 
the malpractice system and that is dominated by managed 
care,247 has statutory provisions protecting certain kinds of 
"studies" from legal discovery or from being admitted into 
evidence at trial. The California Evidence Code, for instance, 
prohibits the records of in-hospital studies aimed at reducing 
"morbidity or mortality" from being admitted into evidence in a 
civil proceeding, although they are subject to discovery.u5 
Another provision of the Evidence Code protects the records of 
"peer review" committees aimed at "improvement of the quality 
of care" from discovery in a civil action.249 Finally, a provision of 
245. See, e.g., National Patient Safety Foundation, News Brief (visited Jan. 20, 
2000) <http://www.ama-assn.org/med-sci/npsflnewsf06_14_99.htm> (noting, for 
example, the NPSF collaboration \vith the FDA, medical and pharmaceutical 
industries, and public interest groups to form cooperative improvements in 
pharmaceutical safety). 
246. For information about the various regional forums held since 1997 in 
Washington, Minnesota, Louisiana, Texas, Massachusetts, and Florida see 
<http://www.ama-assn.org/med-sci/npsflforums.htm> (visited Jan. 20, 2000). 
247. See Elizabeth Rolph et al., Arbitration Agreements in Health Care: Myths 
and Reality, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1997, at 153, 167 (noting that 
California adopted statutory medical malpractice tort reforms in 1975). 
248. See CAL. EVID. CODE§ 1156 (West 1995). 
249. See id. § 1157(a). 
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the Health and Safety Code requires health plans to have 
continuous review of "quality of care, performance of medical 
personnel, utilization of services and facilities and costs."2G0 If 
these quality assurance activities are performed by a "peer 
review committee," these records are also protected from 
discovery. 
Within existing legislation there are some exemptions from 
the usual rules favoring broad discovery in civil litigation for 
health care organizations.251 These exemptions are justified on 
the assumption that patient risk is reduced if the data is not 
allowed to become part of the litigation or regulatory process. 2G2 
Without verifying that assumption, these types of exemptions 
provide the umbrella under which health care organizations can 
undertake research on patient safety.253 
But relying solely upon the professionals within health care 
organizations themselves to create the new knowledge about 
patient safety seems inappropriate for a number of reasons 
unrelated to possible conflicts of interest. First and foremost, the 
kind of knowledge necessary for patient safety-systems 
knowledge about organizational processes-is not particularly 
the province of clinicians. Second, perhaps out of their sense of 
responsibility for their patients, clinicians overestimate legal 
risks and should not be expected to make strategic decisions 
about those legal risks. Third, lawyers who work within health 
care organizations generally see risks only in terms of litigation 
because of health care professionals' fear of malpractice 
litigation. This is perhaps another way of saying that health care 
clinicians and their lawyers are "conservative" and therefore 
unlikely to see the context for change. 
But in California and elsewhere, the seeds of change in the 
legal environment are evident. California is one of the few states 
that allows mandatory arbitration of malpractice claims as a way 
of avoiding the excessive costs of litigation over medical injury.2M 
Recently, however, the California Supreme Court, in Engalla v. 
250. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1370 (West Supp. 1999). 
251. Refer to notes 248-50 supra and accompanying text (citing California 
statutes that protect health care organizations from discovery in civil actions). 
252. See Laurent B. Frantz, Annotation, Discovery of Hospital's Internal Records 
or Communications as to Qualifications or Evaluations of Individual Physician, 81 
AL.R.3d 944, 946 (1977) (establishing that many states adopted these statutes out 
of fear that the committees would not function effectively if their proceedings wore 
subject to discovery). 
253. See id. 
254. See CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE §§ 1281.2, 1290.2 (West 1982) (allowing a court 
to compel arbitration pursuant to a contract between the patient and a health care 
provider). 
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Permanente Medical Group, Inc.,255 ruled that Permanente's 
method of implementing arbitration was potentially 
"fraudulent. "256 One of the reasons for this finding was the 
empirical evidence that arbitration took as long as litigation.257 
Permanente settled the case and sought to "reform" its 
arbitration process by providing some independent oversight of 
the process.256 The invitation to outsiders to ensure the "quality" 
of its arbitration process is a model for how health care 
organizations must pursue research on patient safety.2.:;9 The 
organizations must form partnerships with scholars to achieve 
their goals. These partnerships between health care professionals 
and researchers are more typical in the public health model than 
in the liability model that dominates most of the tort reform 
literature. 260 
California also has imposed a statutory limit on the amount 
of nonpecuniary damages awardable in malpractice cases. Its 
$250,000 limit on the recovery of nonpecuniary loss was 
established in 1975 and has not been raised since.201 Lawyers 
have an incentive to get around this limitation through a number 
of devices, including filing products liability actions to which the 
limitation does not apply. 262 If some of the proposed reforms, such 
as imposing liability on managed care organizations, are 
implemented in California, the incentive to sue the managed care 
organization would grow because there would be no limit on the 
amount of recovery for "wrongful denial" of treatment. In effect, 
255. 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997). 
256. See id. at 908 (concluding that there was sufficient evidence to support the 
trial court's initial findings of Permanente's fraudulent conduct, but that questions 
offact remained to decide if there was "actual" fraud). 
257. See id. at 912 (observing that on average, it takes almost two and a half 
years to actually reach an arbitration hearing with Kaiser). 
258. See Mark A. Kadzielski et al., Managed Care Contracting: Pitfalls and 
Promises, 20 WHI'ITIER L. REv. 385, 403 (explaining that Kaiser convened an 
independent panel that recommended the creation of an advisory group to 
implement an independent administrator arbitration system, the opportunity to 
settle cases early through mediation, and the freedom for patients to choose a single 
arbitrator to settle the dispute). 
259. See David R. Olmos, Kaiser Agrees to Alter Process of Arbitration, L.A 
TIMES, Jan. 6, 1998, at ill. See generaUy DAVYDD J. GREENWOOD & MORTEN LEviN, 
INTRODUCTION TO ACTION RESEARCH: SOCIAL REsEARCH FOR SOCIAL CHANGE 4 
(1998) (defining the concept of action research in part as cooperation between people 
outside and inside the organization). 
260. But see, e.g., Bovbjerg & Sloan, supra note 7, at 55 (promoting a no-fault 
liability system for medical malpractice). 
26L See CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE § 3333.2(b) (West 1997) (effective Sept. 24, 
1975). 
262. Refer to note 34 supra (noting that in the Martin Memorial Hospital case, 
the plaintiffs employed a medical products liability lawyer). 
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there are many threats to the "stable cost structure" surrounding 
patient injury and safety in California and other states. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Lawyers and regulators cannot mandate the new system 
that is needed for error reduction in health care. The system for 
error reduction must be created through the reiterative process 
that has already created the public health system in this country 
and throughout most of the world. At some point, law or the 
regulatory process might put its imprimatur upon the system of 
error reduction. What that legal structure should be-the 
methods by which society holds organizations and individuals 
accountable for the safety of the health care system-is open to 
question. To create that system of accountability requires new 
knowledge. Creating that system also requires abandoning the 
liability model as the paradigm for ensuring safety or inhibiting 
its enhancement. One of the most important roles for lawyers in 
these multidisciplinary efforts is to begin asking questions about 
the relationship of the legal environment to error reduction. 
Examples of the kinds of questions lawyers might pose for 
researchers from a variety of disciplines are as follows: Are the 
"error rates" different in systems in which physicians' risk of 
legal liability for malpractice has been assumed by a health care 
organization? And, are the "error rates" different in fee-for-
service settings as opposed to managed care settings? 
The seminal study on errors in medicine and malpractice-
the Harvard Medical Practice Study-was done in New York 
State on hospital data collected in the 1980s when New York was 
clearly in the "fee-for-service" mode of health care delivery.263 
Thus, the error rates in medicine quoted in the literature and by 
the National Commission are likely based upon that study. 
Further studies in states more in the "managed care" mode need 
to be conducted. 
California and Massachusetts are the two states with the 
largest concentration of managed care enrollees in the country.264 
In addition, some of the largest hospitals in Boston, most of them 
associated with the Harvard Medical School, have moved to a 
263. See Brennan et al., supra note 6, at 370 (presenting the methodology of the 
Harvard study and highlighting the fact that more than 31,000 hospital records 
were reviewed). 
264. See Steven J. Balla, Markets, Governments, and HMO Development in the 
1990s, 24 J. HEALTH POL., POL'¥ & L. 215, 215-16 (1999) (noting that "well over 35 
percent" of the populations of California and Massachusetts were enrolled in 
managed care). 
1999]PATIENT SAFETY, RISK REDUCTION, & THE LAW 1659 
system of contractually assuming the liability of the physicians 
practicing in their hospitals. 265 The theory behind this notion of 
"enterprise liability" is that the hospital is more careful in 
selecting the doctors it allows to practice in its hospital and is 
likely to monitor their work more closely if it pays for the 
malpractice claims of its physicians.266 The reduction of errors 
and injuries in anesthesiology, and the accompanying reduction 
in malpractice claims since the 1980s,267 were the results of the 
synergistic efforts in these hospitals. 
The combination of law-and-economics thinking that has led 
to both the dominance of managed care and "enterprise liability" 
in some aspects of the Massachusetts health care delivery scene 
suggests that researchers might find a different error rate from 
that found in New York in the 1980s. This is not to suggest that 
the error rate is higher or lower, but that researchers should be 
careful to explore whether there is evidence that the legal 
environment is a crucial factor in reducing error rates. 
For slightly different reasons, a comparison between the 
error rates for a similar type of high-risk health care procedure 
in New York and California might provide some provocative 
discussion of the role of law in enhancing or inhibiting patient 
safety. There is also a significant difference in New York and 
California "malpractice law"-California has a more "liberal" 
standard for proving malpractice in court than does New York.z;;a 
Yet California has one of the most restrictive limitations on the 
amount of damages an injured person can recover for "pain and 
suffering" in this country ($250,000),2m while New York has no 
restriction.270 The issue that I encourage researchers to focus on 
265. See Paul C. Weiler, Fixing the Tail: The Place of Malpractice in Health Care 
Reform, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 1157, 1185 (1995). 
266. See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 67, at 393-94. 
267. See Francis H. Miller, Medical Discipline in tlze Twenty-First Century: Are 
Purchasers the Answer?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1997, nt 31, 44 
(recounting how Harvard's shift to self-insurance prompted development of quality 
standards for administering anesthesia, resulting in a remarkable decrease in error 
rates and malpractice claims). 
268. Compare Riley v. Wieman, 528 N.Y.S.2d 925, 928-29 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) 
(summarizing a two-tiered standard in medical malpractice cases that requires 
doctors to conform "to accepted community standards of practice" and use their "best 
judgment and whatever superior knowledge, skill and intelligence" they have), with 
Barris v. Los Angeles, 972 P.2d 966, 971 n.1 (Cal. 1999) {restating the California 
standard of care as requiring physicians to "exercise that degree of skill, lmowledge 
and care ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of their profession under 
similar circumstances"). 
269. Refer to note 261 supra and accompanying text (discussing the California 
statute limiting noneconomic loss). 
270. See, e.g., Tort Law in New York Today, N.Y. ST. B.J., Apr. 1999, at 8, 12 
(explaining that "there are literally no limits on awards for such highly subjective 
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is which aspect of law-the threat of adjudication of ''blame" or 
"fault" in court, or the threat of loss of money through a 
monetary award to a patient-has the greater impact on patient 
safety. The search for new systems of accountability is, however, 
also a search for appropriate methodologies for these 
interdisciplinary efforts. We should not assume that empirical 
methods of economics are the only methods to employ. There may 
be more sophisticated mathematical models available, such as 
those developed in systems engineering.271 
Systems engineering is an alternative method of generating 
empirical methods that will free us from some of the limitations 
of the law-and-economics approach of tort reformers. The 
mathematical models used in systems engineering were designed 
to study complex organizations.272 In contrast, economics started 
with a bias towards individual behavior and contractual notions, 
even when discussing notions such as the "firm. "273 Systems 
engineering will appeal to the positivist tendency of science-
trained health care professionals and to legal scholars inclined 
towards positivist theories oflaw. 
At the same time, lawyers who join with health care 
researchers working within health organizations may have to 
learn some different qualitative methods. This Article suggests 
exploring the applicability of "action research" with its explicit 
critique of the positivist notion of social science.274 Action 
research, on the other hand, is a way of studying organizations 
and their problems that assumes that the outside researchers 
and those within the organization share the same goal of 
enhancing patient safety.275 Action research's commitment to 
democratic research-allowing those in the organization to 
injuries as emotional trauma, loss of companionship, and pain and suffering"). 
271. A method of modeling used in systems engineering that might be helpful in 
analyzing data in large, complex health care organizations is called Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA). See Jon A Chilingerian, Exploring Why Some 
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participate in the definition of problems and the design of 
research-will help to deal with the problem of obtaining 
cooperation from those who must undertake the risks of change-
the health care professionals themselves. 
The positivist tradition sees the professionals as the objects 
of study, whereas the action researcher proposes to engage the 
professionals as co-investigators in improving safety. The action 
researcher does not claim a detached, positivist "indifference" or 
"neutrality" on the issue of patient safety. Furthermore, the 
action researcher is more open to the "politics" of change. In 
other words, the messy process of public health law can be 
invoked to promote change within organizations while generating 
new knowledge for the public policy processes. 
The following hypothesis is therefore proposed: the medical 
liability system and other regulatory processes for health care 
will lose their centrality as optimizers of patient safety when 
health care providers develop systems of detecting, reporting, 
and preventing medical errors that the general public views as 
reliable. In collaborating with the public in a dialogue over 
patient safety, lawyers might learn more about the public health 
law model that is based upon the continuous generation of new 
knowledge to protect the health of the community, which 
includes all present and future patients. If there is to be real 
improvement in reducing the risk of iatrogenic injury to patients, 
we must find those improvements in the less than ideal world of 
constrained professionals and constrained legal institutions. 
Freeing ourselves from the liability model allows us to develop 
methods for incorporating the growth of new knowledge for the 
benefit of the "system of health" through political negotiation, 
new methods of education for professionals, and perhaps 
reformulation of some doctrine or agency practices. 
We simply do not know enough about the safety within 
health care organizations to know what aspects of law are most 
in need of reform. A public health perspective, as a heuristic 
device, considers the possibility that the least amount of legal 
intervention helps to maintain a dynamic equilibrium between 
health care delivery and patient safety. 
